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1 INTRODUCTION 
During the course of the 1980s in Europe the recognition of the 
interdependence of peoples and states in regard to security 
became an increasingly prominent trend. This was accompanied 
by the effort to decrease the significance of military force as a 
means of foreign policy. These developments originally took 
shape on the background of the strategic fixation of the East-
West conflict, which gave rise to an increasing emphasis on the 
indivisibility of peace and security. In the wake of political and 
economic changes in Europe this whole conflict soon began to 
lose its earlier meaning. Military means of maintaining national 
security began to be seen more as a problem than as a solution.' 
The dilemma posed by military armament has traditionally 
been approached through arms control and disarmament. Arms 
control accepts the dynamics of armament, but seeks to control 
and limit it. In its purest form disarmament rejects arms and the 
dynamics of armament altogether. As such the conditions for its 
rapid implementation are, in comparison to other alternatives, 
highly prohibitive.' 
Gradually these approaches have given rise to a scientific 
and political discussion focusing primarily, on the one hand, on 
the critique of mutual deterrence and, on the other, on the switch 
from offensive to exclusively defensive military capacity, which 
is advocated instead of the radical and swift reduction of such 
capacity. The politicization of -this debate was particularly a 
consequence of the transformation of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. Moreover, the debate has expanded beyond its 
European context; a variety of non-offensive defence models 
have been delineated throughout the world. The debate, however, 
has focused less on the nature of the defence posture of the 
international military order than on the armed forces and military 
doctrines of individual states.3  
Non-offensive defence is understood as both a political and 
a military concept.' The fact that through debate about it is 
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possible to affect the allocation of resources in different states 
suffices to show that it is indeed political. The purpose of this 
study, however, is to analyse it exclusively from the military 
viewpoint. Accordingly, the task here is to delineate the 
conditions required by military actors for the practical 
implementation of non-offensive defence measures. 
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2 THE STUDY OF NON-OFFENSIVE 
DEFENCE 
2.1 Concepts 
The theoretical concept of non-offensive defence strongly implies 
that there exists an offensive type of defence which can be 
differentiated from a merely defensive type. One of the initiators 
of the discussion, Horst Afheldt, specifically used the concept of 
defensive defence already in the 1970s.5 The concept came to be 
most commonly designated, especially in West Germany and 
France in the 1980s, by the term "non-offensive defence."6 
Following the mid-1980s the terms "non-provocative defence" 
and "alternative defence" appeared in the western debate on the 
subject.' Innovation in political thinking gave rise to the Soviet 
doctrines of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive sufficiency."$ 
The term "structural inability to launch an attack" 
(Strukturella Angri ffsun fähigkeit) has been used, in a rather different 
sense than the forementioned terms, from 1982 on especially 
within German research circles. In its narrow sense this term 
signifies common security, but when used more broadly it 
connotes a defence strategy and structure intended to serve the 
attainment of extensive collective peace.9 
What all these concepts have in common is the idea of a 
national military system and strategy incapable of offence, but 
sufficiently capable of effectively repulsing attacks. In some cases, 
however, such concepts are used to signify merely the partial 
restriction of offensive capacity at the expense of defence. It is 
held that a non-offensive system would not provoke attack. 
Accordingly, if a sufficient number of states adhered to the ideal 
of non-offensive defence then military stability would prevail.10 
Moreover, it would be difficult to invade, occupy and control a 
non-offensively defended state." Non-offensive defence is thus 
a relative concept which must be scaled to offensive defence and 
attack. Appendix 1 presents a list of concepts relevant to the 
subject along with their definitions. 
The concepts of offence and defence as such have a range of 
possible connotations. According to the division of military action 
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into means and ends these concepts are to be understood in 
terms of aims on the one hand and the instruments needed to 
attain aims on the other. Traditionally the function of military 
force was to wage war for the achievement of political goals. The 
necessary instruments were soldiers as well as arms and other 
forms of technology. 
The debate on non-offensive defence arose, however, in a 
context overshadowed by the existence of nuclear weapons in 
response to the need to make armed force a means for a political 
strategy aiming to prevent war. So also arose the idea of "non-
provocation." A consequence of these developments is that 
offence and defence have come to refer more to ideas and 
structures than to concrete action. Accordingly possible strategies 
are strategies for a hypothetical future war, a war trying to be 
prevented. Defensiveness and offensiveness imply that defence 
and offence refer to both intentions and capabilities backed by 
concrete forces. Non-offensive defence refers both to such forces 
and to principles both of which are to exclude offence as a goal 
and as a means. 
2.2 Basic Premises 
The military credibility of non-offensive defence is a concern of 
peacetime military decision-makers, whose job it is to prepare 
measures to be implemented in case of war. For decision-makers 
war is an undesirable but probable future state of affairs for 
which preparations must be made. The way war is conceived 
affects choices concerning such preparations. 
The basic premise of non-offensive defence as an alternative 
requires the negation of the "normal state of affairs" through 
change. Accordingly existing military systems are seen as 
offensive, even when their means or ends, or both, are referred 
to as defensive. 
Four basic premises can be put forth to serve as a point of 
departure for the formulation of a theoretical viewpoint for the 
study of the present subject. 
1. In war defence must be differentiated from offence in 
order for armed forces and doctrines regarding their use 
to be designated as strictly defensive. It is easier to identify 
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the characteristics of offence than of defence. 
2. For exclusively defensive military deterrence to be 
credible during peacetime it is necessary to distinguish 
between defence and offence in war. Again it is easier to 
identify offensive deterrence than defensive. 
3. Military credibility influences the military decision-
making of the opponent. If an opponent's stance is 
perceived as purely defensive, the probability that 
counter-measures will be less offensive increases. 
4. Because a variety of parties assess each other's actions 
and make decisions in interaction with one another in an 
open system, the military stability of this system requires 
a shared interpretation of military credibility.12 In this 
study, however, credibility is examined from the 
viewpoint of only one actor at a time. 
The aim of this study is to present a general criteria model 
for the evaluation of the credibility of the exclusively defensive 
capability of military organizations. The model is initially tested 
in relation to twelve cases. The purpose is more to become 
familiar with and define the subject than to thoroughly elucidate 
it. Nonetheless, the intention is to delineate the limits of military 
thinking in order to determine the obstacles to, or possibilities 
for, the actual implementation of the organization, doctrine and 
strategy of non-offensive defence by armed forces. 
2.3 Military Theory and Organization 
There exist a diversity of theoretical approaches to the study of 
war and the utilization and function of military force during 
peacetime, since it has been of interest to a variety of scientific 
disciplines. Nonetheless, the study of the distinction between 
defence and offence from the viewpoint of military credibility 
belongs above all to the multi-disciplinary field of military science, 
the specific focus of which is on war research. 
The theories of military science are very controversial. There. 
is a well known attitude of aversion toward the theories expressed 
in the classics of the art of war. Criticism is not, however, aimed 
so much against research as against how such theories or 
"doctrines" are applied in practice by military leaders. In this 
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regard the classics actually strongly emphasize intuition and 
individual characteristics and capabilities, for which doctrine 
and theory are seen mainly as fetters.13 Institutionally bound as 
they are to the armed forces and military culture, operations 
doctrine and tactical research emphasize practical needs and 
optimum applicability. Thus basic research and theory formation 
receive less attention in these fields. 
A distinct military theory is possible only to the extent that 
it can be shown that war, or preparations for it, follow universal 
laws. Wars are usually described as context-bound and unique. 
Nonetheless, regardless of the type of society to which they 
belong armed forces prepare for war according to very much the 
same principles, which reflects the common rationality of 
violence.14 These principles can be considered as constituting 
military theory in relation to the domain in which they are 
universally valid, regardless of whether or not they are actually 
implemented in war. If after war they do not change these 
principles can be considered valid. Military theory is normative. 
It aims to provide guidelines as to how armed force should be 
employed in battle and war. 
The problem with military theory, however, is its basic 
assumptions. To a large extent these assumptions neglect the 
fact that, as with other forms of collective violence, battle and 
war are social. behavior. Consequently, the army is viewed 
primarily as a machine in whose effective operation people are 
merely friction-causing elements. Military theory seeks to provide 
military leaders guidelines for overcoming such "friction." This 
is reflected in the deeply entrenched paradigm of the military 
sciences, which likewise underscores the unique nature of military 
action. 
The conceptualization of battle and war from a broader 
social science perspective would no doubt enhance the theoretical 
framework used for examining the credibility of defensive 
capability. This would also allow the comparison of military 
action to other forms of social behavior if need be. The object 
under study here is in fact military decision-making, which 
always takes place within a certain sociopolitical context. 
Moreover, by considering the state as an organization among 
organizations it becomes possible to utilize organization theory 
in the study of military action. 
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A military organization can be defined as a special state 
organization which wields violence or the threat of violence 
against similar organizations in other states (Appendix 2). As an 
open system the military is often easier to distinguish from its 
sociopolitical environment than many other organizations. In 
particular military roles are empirically distinctly identifiable. 
Moreover, within the range of roles an individual may have 
military ones are the most dominant. In addition to distinct role 
behavior military organization membership involves adherence 
to a characteristic set of norms. For example the organization's 
formal hierarchical structure is maintained by the official norm 
known as military discipline involving absolute obedience to 
superiors' commands. 
One of the postulates of organization theory is that 
organizations seek to decrease uncertainty in their surroundings 
in order to preserve themselves. Uncertainty increases when the 
environment is complex and changes swiftly. The organization 
increases predictability through adherence to a plan of action. 
The main elements of military organization deal with wartime 
operations, serving in particular to reduce uncertainty in decision-
making. The most important element in the environment is the 
potential wartime enemy. With this element in mind the decision-
makers create a programme of action composed of rules and 
plans. Other essential environmental factors are technology, 
geographical conditions and the resources necessary for the 
renewal of the organization.'' 
The input and output of information is of central importance 
to decision-making in the peacetime military organization.16 The 
state's military organization serves above all as a communications 
system when it is not being used for war. Its educational, 
preparation and other activities primarily provide information 
concerning how it will function in war. The official wartime goal 
of the organization is to fulfill its military function. 
The interaction between different military organizations 
gives rise to the input for decision-making. Interpretations of 
such information are subjective." Information interpretation is 
influenced both by the organization's internal norms and by 
those of the outer surroundings. Some of these norms are 
universal among military organizations, since they arise from 
the very nature of such organizations. It is in reference to 
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universal military norms that the concept of military thought is 
used. 
Military thought plays a highly influential role in the military 
organization's programme. It is a prominent aspect of the 
organization's standing operating procedures, which are very 
slow to change in response to innovation.18 
The military way of thinking can be understood as a part of 
military theory. It can be expected to be renewed in the 
socialization and professionalization processes undergone by 
the organization." As the organization is continuously 
regenerated so are its primary structural elements, including its 
programmes. Historical development has left the constituents of 
the military thought relatively unchanged, in spite of the 
transformation of technology and regulations. Thus the 
significance of the military way of thinking assumes a prominent 
part in the coding of communication between organizations 
during peacetime. 
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3 THE CREDIBILITY OF MILITARY 
THREAT 
3.1 Dimensions of Threat 
The study of threat in relation to the international system and 
states is usually carried out from the perspective of conflict and 
deterrence theory. The realist tradition of research in the field 
usually focuses on threats to national security. Observing that 
threats are often linked to the vulnerability of the state, the 
realists define national insecurity as the combination of threat 
and vulnerability. Accordingly, the absence of national insecurity 
serves as a definition of national security; but this is as such a 
controversial way of defining it.2° 
Just as it has been recognized how difficult it is to precisely 
define what is referred to by security and how, because of its 
subjective nature, the idea of national security is on the whole an 
"ambiguous symbol", so threat is considered to be an unclear 
concept having multifarious connotations. It is held that the 
concept of threat needs to be made more precise and used in 
reference to specific contexts. Buzan, for example, divides threats 
into sectors on the basis of their origin, their intensity and 
historical change. The state faces threats from military, political, 
economic, cultural and ecological sectors. In the identification 
and categorization of such threats it is necessary to realize that 
military threat has political aims. But the effort to achieve such 
aims may also be carried out through purely political threat, 
which may in turn be closely linked to cultural and economic 
threat. Ecological threat transcends state borders. The different 
sectors are closely associated.21  
From the viewpoint of state decision-making the sources of 
threats are not solely other states. The increase of international 
actors has made it more necessary than ever for states to adopt a 
broad approach to the assessment of threat sources. The 
magnitude, probability and estimated consequences of threat 
can vary in regard to time and place. Moreover, threat can be 
either actual or potential. The former involves the possibility, 
and usually the indefinite probability, of becoming a direct threat 
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in future circumstances. In deterrence theory these two types of 
threat correspond to immediate and general deterrence 
respectively. 22 
The relevance of threats is also influenced by their openness 
to a variety of subjective interpretations. Thus the meaning of 
threat lies in how its existence is interpreted among the various 
actors involved. The historical dimension of threats signifies 
that the interpretation of the combination of various threat sectors 
and other dimensions may change in the course of time. Threats 
are above all images of threats, ultimately formed on the level of 
the individual. They are conceptions whereby present or future 
conditions are perceived as posing a threat to security or causing 
a feeling of insecurity. The extensiveness and ambiguity of threat 
make it possible for people to perceive it as ubiquitous, and even 
to make it one of the primary constituents of their world-views.23  
The idea that threat interpretation is ultimately dependent 
on the individual has caused researchers to increase focus on its 
psychological nature. The psychological perspective helps explain 
why the precise analysis of threat has met with numerous 
difficulties. One such difficulty concerns the extent to which the 
foreign policy decision-maker's threat conceptions are influenced 
by the same logic which governs his interpretation of threats to 
his personal interests.24 Moreover, people have a need to simplify 
the information they receive and filter it through prejudices. 
Due to these and other disturbances to the communication process 
there may be a considerable divergence between the real 
environment and how it is comprehended. 25  
Given the nature of threat perception on the level of the 
international system and the state, it is possible for a 
communicated threat to be interpreted as military when it is 
actually not so. On the other hand a non-military threat may be 
interpreted as military. It can vary considerably. Military threat 
is by no means necessarily objectively determinable, and to be 
interpreted as such the action in question may need to be analysed 
according to clear guidelines. In military organization decision-
making threat is examined both in its general relation to all 
organizations and in the specific ways it is of significant to the 
armed forces. As with organizations in general, observation of 
the environment requires dealing with the uncertain and the 
active effort to precisely delineate and predict conditions while 
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preserving the organization's freedom of movement. The 
definition of the situation is essential for decision-making. 
The meaning of threat may, however, be different if its 
existence is conceived of as necessary for keeping the 
organization's work going. Threat information is not necessarily 
merely one factor among others determining decision-making 
regarding the definition of circumstances. It may be of central 
importance, perhaps even to such an extent that the delineation 
of threat comprises the whole definition of the situation required 
for decision-making. Professional expertise on the reduction of 
uncertainty is then used to systematize threat as a primary item 
of input for decision-making. 
From the viewpoint of military organizational decision-
making, threat is not merely a factor of psychological fear. It is 
organization-derived and professionally interpreted information 
input, which is a necessary condition for military planning. Thus 
military threat has a special significance for the military 
organization. Its interpretation as such can be expected to differ 
from that of threat in general and from how military threat is 
interpreted in non-military organizations. 
3.2 Military Thought and Threat Interpretation 
Among the conclusions drawn from empirical research there is 
often reference to the tendency of military personnel, due to 
their professional obligations, to employ worst case scenarios 
instead of probability analyses. Moreover, statesmen are said to 
do likewise in the formulation of their interpretations due to the 
alleged predominance of military threat in relation to other 
threats.26 
From the viewpoint of organization theory the assertion 
concerning worst case analysis is in need of clarification: What is 
a so-called worst case? The effort to rationally calculate benefits 
and costs does not necessarily make for balanced preparedness 
in relation to all threats or to all the degrees of military threat. 
The assumption of rationality signifies that in the assessment of 
military threat the ends pursued and means employed by external 
actors and by one's own organization are ranked. This requires 
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the prioritization of threats. The limits of worst case analysis 
vary depending on whether it is applied to an organization's 
internal affairs, to relations between organizations or used to 
rank threats in relation to one another. 
Outside the military organization the worst type of threat 
can be seen as military threat if it is ranked in relation to political 
and economic threats, especially if the psychological phenomena 
of fear is taken into account. For military decision-making, 
however, military threat does not need to be ranked in relation 
to other types of threat. It is technical. It does not necessarily 
recede to the same extent as, for example, it does in the sphere of 
political decision-making. Apparently in creating a base for 
planning military threat is actually interpreted using inexact 
probability assessment to a greater extent than worst case 
analysis. 
The validity of worst case analysis is greater when it 
emphasizes the capability more than the intentions of the 
potential opponent. In contrast to their members, military 
organizations themselves do not have intentions, but only a 
structure, a purpose and processes. Most of the information they 
produce does not reach other military organizations, since it is 
kept secret. The organization's military purpose is among the 
most well guarded secrets. Military doctrine does not necessarily 
indicate what the actual practical aims of the military organization 
are. 
The problem with doctrines is that they are proclamatory 
and thus meant to serve political intentions.27 Furthermore, 
proclaimed doctrines throughout the world mainly reflect 
defensive intentions. Military acts are con mitted in the world, 
however, which at least one actor may interpret as offensive. 
Public doctrines reveal at most political aims, not military ones. 
Therefore in the assessment of military threat intentions are 
inessential. They can only support assessments if they are in 
conformity with the probable structure, including the programme 
and aims, of the organization in question. Thus it is the real 
military tasks and plans for various eventualities which are of 
utmost importance. 
For the most part the organization's purpose or military 
task, as well as its programme, must be determined through the 
examination of the structure of armed forces. In addition various 
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auxiliary conjectures may be employed. For example, it can be 
assumed that the set task is intended to be achieved at reasonable 
cost. In spite of the obstacles involved, the assessment of the 
purpose of military organizations is necessary, because without 
it the instrumental utilization of armed force in case of war 
would be impossible to plan; planning would be pointless. 
Since the accuracy of information concerning aims remains 
questionable, information concerning capability is of greater 
importance. The value of such information is further enhanced 
with an awareness that deception is an essential component of 
military operations. Even if military tasks are made public, there 
remains the suspicion that they, and public rules of strategy and 
tactics as well, are intended to mislead.28 
Due to the numerous factors of uncertainty it faces, the 
assessment of military threat could be expected to be subject to 
great variation and dependence on intuition if it were not for the 
existence of strong regulatory professional factors or controlling 
norms. In the coding of information military thinking is of 
particular importance. Military thinking strongly influences the 
way in which other military organizations' capabilities, and the 
intentions they give rise to, are interpreted as military threat. 
Thus the military organization always has a conception of threat 
which is professional, rational and intuitive. It is based on a very 
systematic analysis of opponents and their probable behavior. In 
this way the number of probable scenarios is reduced. The 
communication of military threat is presented in Appendix 3. 
3.3 Military Credibility 
Military thought, in the context of interaction between military 
organizations, provides a common foundation for interpretations 
of threat which cannot be hidden behind a veil of secrecy. Because 
conceptions of military threat are in certain respects speculative 
and intuitive, military thinking, with its characteristic norms 
and role expectations, forms an exceptionally invariable 
component of the military organization's programme. Likewise, 
for this reason military threat is considerably more clearly 
comprehended within military organizations than among other 
interest groups in society. 
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Military thinkers set standards for determining the credibility 
of threat. Contrary to what may be the case in other contexts, 
these standards are not concerned with whether or not the 
opponent's organization desires to initiate action.29 Military 
credibility can be defined as a conclusion derived from a process 
of interpretation guided by military thought regarding the 
probable aim of the opponent-organization's programme for 
war and its capability for implementing it. 
This claim makes it necessary for the task-strategy or ends-
means relation to conform to the requirement of coherence. It 
thus forms the central element of credibility. Due to the 
interactiveness of communication, credibility is influenced by 
how one's own organization's task and capability are conceived 
in the scenario and by how the opponent is thought to interpret 
them. 
4 DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE 
CAPABILITY 
4.1 Military Theory and the Defence/Offence Distinction 
Military theory is based on the premise that in war all operations 
are geared for battle. In the waging of war the military must 
choose between either offence or defence.3° These two types of 
warfare are likewise the basic options for peacetime decision-
making and planning concerning military aims and strategy, 
even if the chosen political option or the political aim of war is 
always defence. 
In their communicative interaction with one another it is 
hardly possible for the declared exclusively defensive stance of 
one military organization to be accepted as such by the other if it 
cannot according to military theory be distinguished from a 
stance based on offensive capability. Moreover, interference in 
the communication process can give rise to erroneous 
interpretations. This creates the need for utilizing margins of 
certainty to make sure that an interpretation of a threat as 
exclusively defensive is as accurate as possible. According to 
military theory military organizations predictably tend to favor 
offensive doctrines.31 Moreover, the primary concern with offence 
is reinforced by the prominence of secrecy and acts of deception 
and surprise, because there are only two basic alternatives 
-defence and offence- available to the opponent.32 
To establish a margin of certainty it is necessary to attain the 
highest possible level of abstraction in distinguishing between 
defence and offence, thus reducing the number of variables to be 
monitored to a minimum. In its most elementary form military 
thinking is concerned with the interaction of the basic elements 
of battle, namely fire-power, mobility and cover. These elements 
are parts of the concrete physical output produced by the 
organization with technology in time and space. The latter 
involves the use of other geographical factors such as territory in 
extenso. 
In its simplest sense fire-power solely signifies the power 
by which a target is physically destroyed. Mobility includes not 
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only the transference of technology to the appropriate location, 
but also the firing-range of weaponry, the variables of which are 
linked to the need for the mobility of weapons systems. In its 
original sense cover as a physical unit solely signifies the passive 
use of the environment or buildings to protect against fire-power. 
Thus it is conceptually distinguishable from both fire-power and 
manoeuvre. The extent to which the organization of these basic 
elements is different for offence and defence determines the 
validity of the offence/defence dichotomy and at the same time 
reveals the limits within which military theory is applicable.33  
The aim of offence is to gain control over territory. The aim 
of defence is to retain control of territory. This distinction is 
complicated by the fact that territory is not under control if it 
cannot be protected against a counter-attack. Thus in regard to 
aims, defence and offence are partially dependent on one 
another.3" 
Such complications in making distinctions on the level of 
aims indicate that on the level of means or strategy the attainment 
of the aim of attack requires the capacity for counter-attack, i.e. 
for defence, if territorial restrictions are not set. The borderline 
between defence and offence is particularly impossible to draw 
if counter-attack is implemented outside of the territory originally 
involved. In theory, and possibly also in practice, it is possible 
for two military organizations struggling against one another in 
a certain area to both be pursuing defensive aims. Accordingly 
one would be seeking to ward off an extensive counter-attack by 
the other in a way which would be difficult, or nearly impossible, 
to differentiate from defence. Thus at such a stage war cannot be 
seen simply as defence by one party against attack by another. 
Correspondingly even when seen as part of the 
implementation of defence, an extensive counter-attack cannot 
without special qualifications be distinguished from offence. 
The distinction is further complicated by the fact that in the 
struggle for a given area a counter-attack may require 
considerably more troops than defence. However, according to 
the normative principle of non-offensive defence counter-attack 
is allowable but attack is forbidden. The switch from defining an 
area as being under attack to defining it as being under defence 
cannot be derived from military theory. Thus theoretically an 
organization which is capable of attack is also capable of defence. 
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The examination of the development of arms technology 
and its strategic implications for military thinking gives rise to 
another basic problem. The growth in the mobility and firing-
range of weapons systems, particularly in regard to missiles and 
aircraft, and the increase in fire-power provided especially by 
nuclear weapons has created a situation in which theoretically 
either side could destroy the other's organization but 
consequently at the same time bring about the destruction of its 
own. It is precisely this "balance of terror" and the fear of 
escalation it involves which provides the foundation for strategies 
of deterrence. For both parties victory is highly uncertain or 
even practically impossible. 
If a solution to the dilemma of the impossibility of victory 
caused by mutual deterrence were to be sought from military 
theory one of the logical conclusions thereof would be for territory 
to become irrelevant. Territory could not be taken or held, since 
such action could not be undertaken except by setting conditions 
and restrictions on the use of certain types of technology in the 
military organizations's operations. 
The "rescue" of military thought, and consequently the 
possibility for reestablishing the defence/offence distinction, 
apparently requires the restriction of military theory's field of 
applicability in regard to the use of both technology and territory. 
It is continuously necessary to presuppose that the assumption 
of rationality in organization decision-making is valid. 
In regard to technology, the placement of such restrictions 
would require that long-range and victory-negating technology 
either be classified as political or that within the framework of 
military thought victory be seen as secondary. 
The first alternative involves the claim that since by using 
certain forms of technology an organization will bring about its 
own destruction then such technology is not credible. If decision-
making is supposed to be rational then the military organization 
should not be given tasks which are impossible to implement. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that, as with other organizations, the 
armed forces has equipment whose purpose is not derivable 
from the aims of the organization, but rather only from outside. 
Arms technology which does not contribute to military credibility 
may nevertheless promote political deterrence and the credibility 
thereof. 
21 
The depreciation of victory as a component of military 
thinking involves giving the aims-means relation primary status, 
placing it above victory in hierarchical order. The aims-means 
relation can serve as the condition for victory, if victory is actually 
attainable. Even if it is not attainable, the effort will be made to 
set aims which are at least to some degree realizable. This leads 
to the idea that the winning of war is not one of the functions of 
the military. Accordingly if war breaks out, victory can only be a 
political goal; the function of the military is more concrete and 
restricted .35  
Even if concern for territory were to be reestablished within 
the framework of military thought, it would still be necessary to 
limit it. Otherwise with the outbreak of war it would be difficult 
to distinguish between defence and offence. The restriction of 
concern for territory is, however, well-grounded, since non-
offensive defence is part of a political strategy for the prevention 
of war involving emphasis on peacetime military decision-
making and planning. The military organization thus has its 
"own" territory with that of the opponent being "foreign." It is 
not acceptable to plan to make territory one's own because it has 
been invaded. 
From the political viewpoint this restriction involves the 
supposition of a status quo. This is analytically necessary for the 
delineation the distinction between defence and offence and the 
conditions for military credibility. This restriction provides an 
opportunity to try to make a territorial distinction between two 
organizations one of which is deemed to have the capability for 
offence and defence in the "foreign" territory while the other 
only has the capacity for defence in its "own" territory. 
4.2 The Necessary Conditions for Offensive Capability 
A military organization can probably seize a given territory if it 
has the fire-power to destroy its opponent and is able to provide 
sufficient troops for occupation and the repulsion of counter-
attacks. To reach its target fire-power requires mobility. Mobility 
in turn requires further mobility. A military organization cannot 
initiate an attack without manoeuvering its fire-power swiftly 
and by surprise over the border into the "foreign" territory. The 
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need for manoeuvrability is most decisive at the beginning of 
battle. Theoretically the defence of one's "own" territory can 
begin without manoeuvre. At any rate manoeuvrability is needed 
only at a later stage, for the implementation of counter-attacks. 
However, the conditions for cover in regard to both time and 
place are the same in offence and defence. The use of both fire-
power and mobility can begin without it in both forms of struggle; 
but the need for cover remains constant throughout the period 
of battle.36 
The conveyance of fire-power into foreign territory and 
manoeuvrability therein requires technology which either has a 
range extending from one's own area or which provides for the 
transportation of the troops for implementing them. The 
geographical conditions of the territory, including its extent, 
terrain and meteorological factors can either facilitate or hinder 
the extension of fire-power to the targets. 
For offence the most essential of the basic elements of battle 
is mobility. Mobility is decisively more important in the 
implementation of the lower level principles of military action, 
such as surprise, than in defence. Moreover, its time of use is 
clearly during the beginning of battle. 
An opponent will probably be interpreted as constituting 
an offensive threat if its organization has the capability, taking 
into consideration technology, geography and factors for 
organizational renewal, to manoeuvre its fire-power and troops 
into another's territory. Such an interpretation gains support 
from the fact that military organizations tend to favor the 
maintenance of offensive capability due to the margin of certainty 
it provides. The interpretation of communication also involves 
the evaluation of the supposed threat in relation to the aims and 
programmes of one's own organization. Although the definition 
of the power relation between the parties involved is indeed 
difficult, it is intuitively significant, particularly when the relation 
is considerably uneven. The perceived credibility of the 
opponent's offensive threat is doubtlessly bolstered if one's own 
organization takes a defensive stance and its power is judged to 
be deficient. 
Thus the necessary condition for offensive power is the 
ability to implement a massive invasion into "foreign" territory, 
i.e. into the interpreter's "own" territory, at the onset of battle. If 
23 
the other party's aim is, however, defensive but involves 
readiness to employ a preemptory strike to prevent the opponent 
from initiating attack, it runs the chance of being interpreted as 
having credible offensive power. Therefore non-offensive defence 
cannot involve such pre-emptory capacity. This requirement 
pushes defence strategy still further toward the minimization of 
manoeuvrability. 
The fulfillment of the necessary conditions for offensive 
capability in regard to the basic elements of warfare indicates 
that the, mainly lower level, principles of military thinking will 
not become less stringent. The possibilities for utilizing fire-
power, manoeuvrability and cover in different combinations are 
increase. An organization may, for example, focus an attack on 
an area where the opponent has only little power and where 
other factors, such as terrain and weather, favor surprise. 
Certainty concerning the credibility of offensive capability grows 
as the hypothetical combinations of the various principles 
increase. This in turn provides grounds for differentiating 
between offence and defence by restricting the use of the different 
basic elements of warfare. 
4.3 A Criteria Model of Exclusively Defensive Capability 
The sufficient conditions which a military organization confined 
to its "own" territory must meet to be defined as exclusively 
defensive cannot be simply derived from the necessary conditions 
for the credibility of offensive capability. Nevertheless, using the 
negations of the conditions for offensive capability a preliminary 
criteria model is formulated in Diagram 1. 
In the selection of variables the grouping and strategy of the 
organization is simplified into the basic elements of warfare. 
Although the organization's technology is indeed a primary 
type of input, the consequences of fire-power, mobility and 
cover must also be examined in relation to the lower level 
variables involved in the normal social behavior of the 
organization. The other three main variables in the model consist 
of geographical factors, organization maintenance and the 
opponent's organization with the corresponding factors. 
Maintenance factors include all the state and societal resources 
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which according to peacetime planning are to be used to maintain 
the organization in wartime. 
Basic Variables 	 Defensive Criteria 
1 The elements of 
warfare as displayed 
by the military organ-
ization and its technology 
1.1 Fire-power 
1.2 Mobility 
1.3 Cover 
2 Geographical factors 
3 Organization maintenance 
factors 
4 Antagonistic military 
organization, its 
technology and its 
geographical and 
maintenance factors 
Restricted to one's own territory 
Restricted to one's own 
territory, but involving 
the capacity for counter-attacks 
Available 
Promote defence in one's 
own territory 
Promote defence in one's 
own territory 
Invulnerable to attack in 
its own territory, but 
vulnerable to defence 
against it in foreign 
territory 
Diagram 1. Criteria Model of Exclusively Defensive Capability 
The criteria model sets restrictions on the capacity for 
counter-attack, which is an essential ingredient of effective 
defence, including non-offensive defence. Consequently, counter-
attacks must be initiated within one's own territory, since 
deployment outside it is impermissible. Thus an organization 
forced out of its own area, which can be interpreted as having 
the capacity to restore the pre-war status quo, is susceptible to 
being considered to possess offensive capability. 
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5 THE MILITARY CREDIBILITY OF 
NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE 
5.1 Implications of the Criteria Model 
The criteria model of defence can be further elucidated by 
examining some of the implications to which it gives rise. This 
examination in turn provides grounds for the initial evaluation 
of the stipulated or already actually existing military potential of 
non-offensive defence. Such an assessment, however, must 
inevitably be rough, serving only to orient further investigation. 
Nonetheless, as such it doubtlessly provides an understanding 
of the requirements of military credibility. 
The criteria model presupposes a territorial defence system 
(Appendix 4). All operations which might extend into the territory 
of another state are forbidden. All troops intended for use in 
operational counter-attacks are to be kept away from the border. 
The mobility allowed such troops depends on the extent of the 
territory, and on other geographical factors such as the location 
of areas significant to the continuation of defence. 
Reserves are to be dispersed so as not to invite pre-emptive 
strikes. If their dispersal is not feasible geographically then it 
must be done temporally. Accordingly, in a more restricted 
territory counter-attack forces are to be mobilized only when 
needed while in a broader territory they may be spread out in a 
state of full preparation. Proceeding from the border into the 
interior the defence system becomes progressively more 
condensed with the increasing mobility allowed to it. 
The restriction of manoeuvrability requires the exclusion of 
all air forces except for air defence fighters and some helicopters. 
Large numbers of assault aircraft, in so far as they signify the 
capacity to project power beyond one's own territory, represent 
offensive capability. The strategic airlift capacity also exceeds 
the scope of strictly defensive military capability. 
The model cannot include ocean fleets, unless the political 
definition of a country's "own" territory involves the division of 
the seas between different states. In reality the prominent problem 
of the oceanic links necessary for defence, for example in the 
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case of NATO, cannot be solved through military thought if the 
freedom of the seas is upheld. 
The precise classification of weapons systems as defensive 
and offensive is almost impossible. For practical purposes, 
however, certain systems can be considered more offensive than 
others. The requirement for the minimization of manoeuvrability 
does not therefore allow the possession of ballistic or cruise 
missiles or otherwise of rockets whose range and number make 
possible the extensive bombing of another state's territory. 
Accordingly, the permissible maximum firing-range is 
approximately fifty kilometers. Likewise, the maintenance of a 
relatively large amount of armored and motorized forces in a 
restricted geographical area, or in excess of what is required for 
carrying out a counter-attack in one's own territory represents 
offensive capacity. 
The maintenance of a military organization cannot involve 
a weapons production industry which would allow for the swift 
transformation of a purely defensive system into an offensive 
one. Exclusively defensive capacity would, however, necessitate, 
especially in large regions, extensive staff-resources. Moreover, 
the armed forces would have to enjoy the special approval of the 
local population in order for territorial defence, and the guerilla 
operations which are an essential part of it, to be possible. 
The criteria model variable involving the image of the 
potential opponent from the viewpoint of one's own organization 
is perhaps the most difficult to elucidate. An environment 
containing strictly defensive armed forces is less threatening 
than one involving offensive potential. Without organization-
level examination, however, imprecise interpretation may have 
a strong influence. For example, a weak neighbor of a strong 
state may for various reasons be more prone to emphasize, even 
without making an analysis of the political situation, its 
neighbor's offensive capacity than a state whose capability is 
more or less equal to that of its neighbor. 
The number of actors and the probability of confrontation 
in the environment are also influential factors. For example, 
extreme political and economic antagonism between actors within 
a given society will probably cause neighboring states to expect 
the likelihood of offensive action by it to be greater than by an 
internally more peaceful neighbor whose military organization's 
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purpose and capacity may be just as offensive. An organization 
surrounded by many actors may, however, increase its margin 
of certainty if the main focal points of antagonism are, for 
historical or other threat-explaining reasons, unclear. 
5.2 Measuring the Defensive Capability of Armed Forces: 
Twelve Cases 
Twelve different military organizations have been selected for 
examination here, namely those of Chile, China, Finland, France, 
Japan, Luxemburg, Pakistan, Singapore, the Soviet Union, 
Sweden, Tanzania and the United States. This list thus includes 
the organizations of small and large states, both aligned and 
nonaligned, and of industrialized and developing countries. The 
examination is deliberately carried out without reference to 
political contexts in order to emphasize purely military factors 
and to take into consideration the organizations' environment 
without the analysis of intentions. Consequently, the antagonistic 
military organizations referred to by the criteria model simply 
signify the armed forces of states which are within the reach of 
the military power of each state under consideration, regardless 
of what type of relations exist between the states in question. 
Table 1 presents general data concerning the states under 
consideration, and Tables 2 and 3 present details concerning 
their respective armed forces. Table 4 displays some of the 
parameters of the variables which are important for the evaluation 
of exclusively defensive capability. These figures are not as such 
especially significant, but they can be of use particularly in the 
delineation of the qualitative differences between the armed 
forces of the examined countries. 
State 	 Population 	Surface area 	Population 
(km2) 	 per km2 
Chile 12 958 000 757 000 17 
China 1 115 552 000 9 561 000 117 
Finland 5 010 000 338 000 15 
France 56 414 000 552 000 102 
Japan 123 599 000 378 000 327 
Luxembourg 365 000 2 600 140 
Pakistan 111 611 000 796 000 140 
Singapore 2 694 000 600 4 359 
Soviet Union 288 561 000 22 402 000 13 
Sweden 8 344 000 450 000 19 
Tanzania 26 574 000 945 000 28 
United States 248 855 000 9 373 000 27 
Table 1. General Data on the States Examined37 
State 	 Total no, of troops 	 No. of army 
.troops 
Active 	 Reserves 
Chile 96 000 102 000 54 000 
China 3 030 000 1 200 000 < 2 300 000 
Finland 31 000 700 000 28 000 
France 461 	,0 1 733 000 289 000 
Japan 378 000 249 000 156 000 
Luxemburg 800 — 800 
Pakistan 550 000 513 000 500 000 
Singapore 56 000 207 000 45 000 
Soviet Union 3 988 000 5 602 000 1 473 000 
Sweden 64 000 709 000 45 000 
Tanzania 47 000 10 000 45 000 
United States 2 118 000 1 819 000 761 000 
Table 2. Total Armed Forces Personnel and Total Army Personne138 
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State 
Chile 
China 
Finland 
France 
Japan 
Luxemburg 
Pakistan 
Singapore 
Soviet Union 
Sweden 
Tanzania 
United States 
Military equipment 
MBTs 	APCs, 
AIFVs 
231 	520 
8 000 	2 800 
180 300 
1 340 4 948 
1 222 550 
— 5 
1850 800 
	
— 	1000 
61 500 	78 000 
785 	600 
60 	75 
15 440 	31 435 
Ftrs, OCs, 
FGAs, CCs 
Tpts 
15 9 
49 17 
18 
4 600 19 
1 180 1 044 
600 
64 -  
— 21 
3 
248 15 
183 73 
110 
207 6 
78 86 
54 
— No sea- 
outlet 
229 3 
208 45 
20 
40 - 
111 29 
16 
4140 142 
3 921 785 
1 870 
207 - 
81 54 
8 
24 - 
— 18 
615 154 
4166 223 
1 133 
Table 3. Military Equipment39 
Abbreviations: MBTs, main battle tanks; APCs, armoured personnel carriers; 
AIFVs, armoured infantry fighting vehicles; Ftrs, fighters; FGAs, fighters, ground 
attack; Tpts, transporters; OCs, ocean combatants; CCs, coastal combatants. 
State 	Active & reserve 
troops per km2 
MBT per 
active army 
troops 
Km2 per 
Ftr 
Army 
troops 
per Tpt 
Chile 	 0.3 0.004 50 470 3 000 
China 0.4 0.004 2 080 3 830 
Finland 	2.2 0.006 5 280 9 270 
France 4.0 0.005 2 230 2 620 
Japan 	 0.8 0.008 1 830 2 900 
Luxemburg 	0.3 - - - 
Pakistan 1.3 0.004 3 480 25 000 
Singapore 	438.3 - 16 2 810 
Soviet Union 	0.4 0.042 5 410 790 
Sweden 	1.7 0.017 2170 5 560 
Tanzania 0.1 0.001 39 380 7 500 
United States 	0.4 0.020 15 240 670 
Table 4. 	Parameters of Military Capability 
Abbreviations: see Table 3 
All of the armed forces under consideration, except for 
those of Chile, Luxemburg and Tanzania, possess missiles with 
a range clearly exceeding fifty kilometers and whose numbers 
are of operational significance. Of all the countries examined the 
Soviet Union and the United States have both the largest number 
of missiles and the widest selection of ranges. The Soviet Union 
has 5 904 exclusively nuclear-capable launchers. Of these 3 058 
are land-based, 2 012 are sea-based and 834 are air-launched. 
The corresponding total number for the United States is 2 083, of 
which 1 065 are land-based, 712 are sea-based and 306 are air-
launched. The tactical missile systems of these countries are in 
most cases composed of either anti-ship missiles or air-to-surface 
missiles (see Table 5).40 
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State Missile system Purpose Range (km) 
China CSS-2 strategic < 2 700 
CSS-3 < 7 000 
CSS-4 > 10 000 
CSS-N-3 < 2 800 
CSS-N-2 anti-ship 95 
Type M air-to-surface 600 
HY-4 150 
Finland Styx anti-ship 80 
RBS 15 c. 150 
France S-3D strategic > 3 500 
M-20 > 3 000 
M-4 4 500 
Hades surface-to-surface 350 
Pluton 120 
Exocet MM-40 anti-ship 70 
" 	AM-39 70 
Martel air-to-surface 60 
Japan Harpoon anti-ship > 90 
Pakistan Harpoon anti-ship > 90 
Singapore Harpoon anti-ship > 90 
Sweden RB 08 anti-ship c. 150 
RBS 15 c. 150 
Table 5. Examples of Missile Systems of over 50 km Range41  
The armed forces of China, France, the Soviet Union and 
the United States cannot be considered exclusively defensive. 
Their strategic weapons, airlift capability, assault fighters and 
bombers and large oceanic navies allow them if need be to 
extend their fire-power far beyond the borders of their own 
territories. In the case of China, however, adherence to a defensive 
posture is indicated by the fact that in the ratio of defensive 
fighters to ground attack fighters and bombers the number of 
the former is considerably larger than the latter; this is also true 
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of the ratio of Chinese coastal combatants to ocean combatants. 
Nor does China, unlike the three other states mentioned, possess 
military bases abroad. 
In the case of France an element of non-offensive defence is 
the large size of its reserves in relation to the country's total 
surface area. This makes for effective territorial defence. The 
total number of air force planes and the area covered per fighter 
also indicate the degree of France's defensive orientation. The 
military environment does not involve a high degree of offensive 
credibility. Like the United States, France does, however, have 
the technological and economic capacity to enhance its military 
attack and intervention capability. Thus on the whole the French 
military establishment displays a credible offensive stance. 
Given the differences in the geo-strategic factors influencing 
them, it is understandable that the Soviet Union stresses army 
power while the United States stresses naval power. The number 
of tanks possessed by the Soviet Union, at least before the 
reductions called for by the CFE Treaty, and in particular the air 
forces of the United States clearly represent offensive capability, 
especially when their potential enemies and the geographical 
conditions of their state territories are taken into account. In 
spite of having a credible predominately offensive orientation, 
the Soviet military does have an element of non-offensive defence 
in that the amount of its defensive fighters is greater than that of 
its ground attack fighters and bombers. 
Chile, Pakistan and Tanzania are suitable for comparison to 
one another. Each has a rather extensive territory of about equal 
size. Moreover, all three are non-aligned third world countries. 
The Tanzanian armed forces are clearly defensive; this is true 
even in relation to the country's surroundings. The Tanzanian 
military lacks almost all the elements of offensive capability 
stipulated by the criteria model. On the other hand it possesses 
neither the power nor the proper terrain for comprehensive 
territorial defence. The degree to which a military establishment 
can be considered defensive depends not merely on the nature 
of its own capability but even more on the nature of surrounding 
military organizations. 
Pakistan's offensive capacity is represented above all by its 
battle tanks and its efforts to increase the scope of its missiles.42 
The country is, however, situated close to two relatively strong 
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military powers, India and Iran. Moreover, Pakistan's number 
of military troops relative to population amount and density 
makes more for defensive than offensive military capacity. 
Chile's military-geographical conditions are exceptional. 
Chile is a long and narrow country bordered by an extensive 
coastline on the one side and on the other by a mountain chain 
which forms a natural barrier. The amount of ocean combatants 
and armoured troops, along with the rather extensive air transport 
capability, possessed by the Chilean military do not make it a 
particularly offensive power, especially considering the defensive 
capacity of the surrounding military organizations of Argentina, 
Bolivia and Peru. The region poses special problems for air 
defence which explains why Chile's defensive fighter capability 
is small in comparison to its ground attack capability. 
Nonetheless, Chile's armed forces are predominantly defensive. 
Sweden and Finland are, in regard to their territories, 
conditions and surroundings, readily comparable. Neither of 
their armed forces represent offensive capability. This is 
demonstrated, for example, by the predominance of defensive 
fighters in their air forces, by the small-scale air-transport capacity 
which is necessary due to their extensive territories, and by the 
fact that they have only a small amount of long-range missile 
systems. In a physical environment characterized by abundant 
forests and bodies of water, the quantity of Finnish and Swedish 
troops allows for comprehensive territorial defence, including 
operational counter-attacks. However, the number of tanks 
possessed, especially by Finland, does not indicate capacity for 
extending army fire-power beyond national territory. The military 
organizations of both countries must take into account 
surroundings involving significant military potential, such as 
that of the Soviet Union and the United States Navy. 
Consequently, it is difficult to fulfill the criterion of defensive 
capability concerning the military environment. Nonetheless, 
unlike in the case of Tanzania for example, the number of soldiers 
in relation to total area in Sweden and Finland appears to be 
highly sufficient for meeting defensive needs. Therefore the 
armed forces of Sweden and Finland come close to fulfilling the 
ideal of exclusively defensive capability. 
Japan is a highly populated and urbanized island state. It 
therefore needs a relatively large number of troops, but very 
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little long-range fire-power outside of the navy. Japan's military 
fulfills the criteria of strictly defensive capability, although its 
navy is strong and capable of wide-ranging operations. 
Considering its surroundings, Japan's armed forces cannot be 
classified as offensive; but the value of Japan's strictly defensive 
posture is diminished by the presence of United States forces 
and their employment of nuclear deterrence. 
Militarily the two small states Luxemburg and Singapore 
are very different from one another. Luxemburg's armed forces 
are very small while Singapore's are very strongly equipped. 
The defence of Luxemburg's territory is strongly dependent on 
NATO; its armed forces do not have the least capacity for offence 
in the surrounding regions. As with Tanzania, Luxemburg's 
capacity for defence is restricted. For example, it has no air force. 
Moreover, its armed forces are too small to carry out effective 
defence within its own territory against foreign military forces. 
Singapore, in contrast, appears in spite of its small size to be 
able to maintain independent military capability. This state 
essentially consists of one big city, which well justifies the high 
number of soldiers in relation to total area. In practice national 
defence would almost exclusively consist of urban warfare and 
coastal defence. 
In regard to the distinction between defence and offence 
Singapore's armed forces provide a concrete example of how 
given lack of strategic depth military thinking focuses on 
deterrence. The amount of armored equipment, fighters and 
transporters and the ratio of defensive fighters to ground attack 
aircraft maintained by Singapore indicate that it has the capacity 
to sustain armed forces operations outside its own territory. 
Thus according to the criteria of exclusively defensive capability 
Singapore's military power would have to be considered 
offensive. But Singapore's defensive orientation can be seen as 
more extensive if one takes not only these criteria into account 
but also the fact that the country is surrounded by relatively 
strong military powers. 
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5.3 Conclusions 
It is not relevant here to place the examined military organizations 
in hierarchical order according to the degree to which they are 
exclusively defensive. The very positivistic analytical approach 
used here does not allow for a more detailed comparative 
examination of the interpretations of these states' own armed 
forces. If the criterion regarding the surrounding military 
environment is taken into consideration then the armed forces of 
none of the states examined can be considered as exclusively 
defensive. Luxemburg, Sweden and Finland come closest to 
realizing the ideal of non-offensive defence. 
This initial examination does, however, further prove that 
the military organizations of states which are large in terms of 
territory and resources maintain a more offensive stance than 
those of small ones. An exclusively defensive profile is most 
suitable for the military organizations of small and medium 
states whose surroundings do not contain strong antagonistic 
military powers. This condition was not displayed in any of the 
cases examined. 
The situation for a military organization in a microstate is 
always difficult, particularly when it is located near military 
powers possessing significant offensive capacity. In the effort to 
make itself as militarily inviolable as possible it is difficult for a 
small state to avoid adopting offensive elements. The alternative 
involves relinquishing parts of the military system which are 
also important for defence and relying on what outside support 
is to be had. 
The credibility requirements set forth by military thinkers 
do not necessarily alone direct armed forces development, 
because in reality many political, economic and social factors 
influence decisive decisions. Armed forces may become 
increasingly technical and professionalized while at the same 
time being decreased in size. The resulting mobile high tech 
organization is difficult to classify according to the offence/ 
defence distinction. It may not necessarily be capable of retaining 
its own territory, little less territory it has captured. Nevertheless, 
it can be interpreted as having a credible predominantly offensive 
capacity. By taking into consideration the margin of certainty 
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required for interpretation, it could launch an attack so as to 
make it indistinguishable from the initiation of defence. 
It does not seem probable that non-offensive defence will 
be implemented solely according to the requirements of military 
credibility. An exclusively defensive system and strategy require 
very extensive arms reduction and transarmament. Such 
requirements are formidable, especially for the big powers, since 
they would affect the whole military; ideally they would entail 
the relinquishment, for example, of large numbers of missiles, 
almost all nuclear weapons and foreign bases. On the other 
hand, demands on reducing mobility would concern states with 
small territories. The primary focus of such requirements would 
be on new technology. If the political conditions for such 
reductions were realized then non-offensive defence would be 
closer to disarmament than to arms control. As such it could be 
implemented as part of a large-scale disarmament process. 
This initial examination, aided by a rather rough model of 
the requirements which non-offensive defence must meet to be 
militarily credible, indicates that military thought sets forth very 
strict conditions for non-offensive defence. Organizations, 
however, seek to preserve themselves. In an uncertain 
environment the conversion of one's own offence-capable 
organization from the inside into one solely capable of defence is 
difficult, especially if the termination of large parts of it is 
required. In such a case other factors may become more important 
than the defence/offence distinction in the structure and agenda 
of the organization. Conditions for diminishing the offensive 
capacity of armed forces are created, however, by taking military 
thought into account in the political process. In the international 
environment, however, not all states are bestowed with equally 
favorable conditions for the implementation of this type of 
change. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Concepts and Definitions associated with Non-offensive Defence 
Mutual defensive superiority 
A situation existing between two nations or alliances 
resulting from the implementation of non-offensive defence 
"whereby each side has a defensive capability greater than 
its opponent's offensive capability."' 
Non-offensive defence 
A defence system and strategy requiring the relinquishment 
of offensive capability. It involves the maintenance of 
sufficient defensive capacity to effectively dissuade 
aggression by convincing the aggressor of the impossibility 
of attaining his goals (deterrence by denial). Non-offensive 
defence should not provide an opponent any inducement 
to undertake pre-emptive strikes. Moreover, in the event 
that deterrence fails defence should strive to limit damage; 
it should not be suicidal.' 
Non-provocative defence 
An alternative defence system which the enemy considers 
neither offensive nor provocative.3  
Robert Neild, "Non-offensive Defence: The Way to Achieve Common Security 
in Europe," Background Paper 25, January 1989, Canadian Institute for 
International Peace and Security, p. 4. 
Bjorn Meller, "Disengagement and Non-offensive Defence in Europe," 
Working Paper 2,1987, Centre of Peace and Conflict Research, University of 
Copenhagen, pp. 11-12. 
Maire-Louise von Muijen, "Recent Developments in the Alternative Defence 
Debate." Paper for the workshop "The Superpowers and Europe: An 
Emerging New Order?" European Consortium for Political Research, 10-15 
April 1989, Paris. 
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2. • A way of defence whereby a state which adopted it would 
not pose a threat outside its own borders, but would 
nevertheless preserve the capacity for effective resistance 
within them. This would entail making the country difficult 
and expensive to attack and occupy. The defender's offensive 
capacity would have to be limited as much as possible to his 
own territory. But all military groupings would not need to 
adopt a strictly defensive stance.` 
Reasonable military sufficiency 
A "minimum quantitative/qualitative level of armed forces 
and armaments following the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons and other systems of mass destruction by all States, 
a level which ensures for each of them guaranteed protection 
but which is insufficient for launching a surprise attack or 
conducting aggressive operations in general."5  
Structural incapacity for attack 
Stritkturelle Angriffsunf(ihigkeit 
1. — Incapacity for pursuit of offensive operations, i.e. 
launching attacks against the enemy's territory and its 
seizure; 
— Incapacity for staging counter-attacks designed to 
seize the enemy's territory; 
— Incapacity to launch strikes deep into the enemy's 
territory, even in the event of absence of the intent to 
seize the area.6 
4 Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Militant./ Technology and 
International Relations (Worcester: MacMillan Press, 1987), pp. 276-284; Barry 
Buzan, "Common Security, Nonprovocative Defence and the Future of 
Western Europe," Review of International Studies, vol. 13, 1987, pp. 265-279. 
5 D.T. Yazov, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," The RUSI Journal, vol. 134, no. 4 
(Winter 1989), pp. 1-4. 
6 Janusz Prystrom, "Conventional Disarmament and Security Building 
Measures as a Subject of Research pursued in the Socialist States," UNIDIR 
Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 3 (September 1988), pp. 8-10. 
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A defence strategy and armed forces structure based on 
the ideas of common security and defensive dissuasion 
(Defensive Abhaltung) intended to achieve stability through 
disarmament and conversion. In the broad sense the 
structural incapacity for attack provides a suitable strategy 
and armed forces structure for the idea of "Common Peace" 
and the goal of a "New European Peace Order."7  
Transarmament 
A process involving a shift from offensive weaponry to 
defensive weaponry.$ 
7 Dieter S. Lutz,ZurheorieStrukturellerAneriffswtfohigkeit,HamburgerBeiträge 
zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Heft 22, 1987, Institut fur 
Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universit it Hamburg. 
8 Johan Galtung, There are Alternatives! Fotir Roads to Peace and Security 
(Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984),162-163. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Structural Dimensions of the Military Organization and Military Action 
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APPENDIX 3 
Communication of Military Threat During Peacetime 
APPENDIX 4 
Implications of the Criteria Model of Non-offensive Defence 
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DOCUMENTATION 
Report of the Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence 
Policy; 19 December 1990 
ESTIMATE OF THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES' 
CURRENT STATE AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY 
AS WELL AS AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEFENCE 
FORCES' DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND DEFENCE 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE 1990'S *) 
Excerpts: 
FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
The Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence Policy received on 2 
February 1990 the task of estimating the Defence Forces' current 
performance capability as well as giving its assessment regarding the 
development plans and defence appropriation requirements of the 
armed forces for the 1990's. In the course of its deliberations the advisory 
board has set about to define more precisely the first part of its task, the 
current state of the Defence Forces, through addenda. 
The advisory board has carefully familiarized itself with the current 
state and performance capability of the Defence Forces. In studying the 
matters related to the future development and appropriations 
requirements it has received accounts regarding the system of defence, 
land forces, naval forces, air forces as well as other military related 
areas. 
The advisory board's appraisal of the matters was carried out in such a 
fashion that the introduction embraces background materials, the second 
*) Second of the two reports prepared by the Parliamentary Advisory 
Board for Defence Policy. The first report of 28 February 1990, was 
published in the previous issue (Finnish Defence Studies 2, 1991). 
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section presents an estimate of the Defence Forces' current state and 
performance capability and the third section presents views regarding 
the Defence Forces' development plans and appropriations for the 
1990's. 
The advisory board respectfully submits its findings to the Ministry of 
Defence. 
Helsinki, 19 December 1990 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The role of the Defence Forces is to support our country's foreign 
policy, the goal of which is the preservation of our national independence 
as well as to safeguard the living conditions of its citizens. The basic 
objective of the Defence Forces is to raise the cost of attack higher than 
any conceivable benefit that an aggressor might hope to gain, and thus 
to deter any possible aggressor from the notion of using the area of 
Finland for hostile purposes. However, if this does not succeed and our 
country is either threatened with attack or becomes a target of military 
action, the Defence Forces will be able to offer to the government the 
means for crisis management with which to deal with any threat ranging 
from territorial surveillance to repulsing of violations of Finnish territory 
or air-space, all the way to extensive and wide-ranging defensive 
operations. 
Certain treaties to which Finland is a signatory place both military 
limits and legal obligations on the country. The treaties signed in 1922 
and 1940 regarding the Aaland Islands confirm the demilitarized nature 
of that area during peace-time but also oblige Finland to defend the 
islands during war. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 sets certain 
quantitative and qualitative limits on the Finnish Defence Forces. 
However, in a decision on 21 September 1990 the Government of Finland 
unilaterally stated that the stipulations of Part III of the Peace Treaty, 
dealing with the limitations on Finnish sovereignty, have lost their 
relevance, with the exception of the ban on nuclear weapons. In the 
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 1948 with 
the Soviet Union Finland guarantees that it will not allow its area to be 
used in an attack against the Soviet Union. 
The Finnish system of government maintains that each citizen has a 
duty to take part in the defence of the country. For males this duty is 
manifested in the law regarding universal conscription which mandates 
either military or civilian service for the conscript. In addition, the laws 
of civil defence and labour commitment contain obligations for Finnish 
citizens to participate in tasks related to national defence. The obligations 
concerning national defence presume that, if necessary, all national 
resources will be mobilized for this purpose. 
The tasks of military defence are set out in the Law on the Defence 
Forces (402/74) which sets out the obligations of the Defence Forces 
during times of peace, threat of war and war. 
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According to the Law the tasks of the Defence Forces are: 
1) To work together with other national bodies to oversee the nation's 
land, sea and air space; 
2) To guarantee the inviolability of the nation through force if necessary; 
3) To defend the nation and its legal procedures as well as the living 
conditions and basic rights of the citizens; 
4) To oversee the preparedness, maintenance and development needs 
of the nation's armed forces; 
5) To give military instruction as will as promote the will to defend the 
nation and the implementation of activity to improve national 
physical fitness; 
6) To give, when needed, aid to the civilian authorities to maintain law 
and order as decreed by statute; 
7) To contribute to the activities of the United Nations by organizing 
detachments that can be used in UN peacekeeping operations; 
8) To carry out other functions set forth by law. 
A general requirement to be set for defence capability is that it must be 
preserved and upheld at such a level that it will be possible to adapt to 
rapidly changing situations, to control different types of crises and, 
when called upon, to thwart different types of military measures directed 
against our country or to prevent our land, sea and airspace from being 
used in an attack against a third country. 
2. THE CURRENT STATE AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY 
OF THE DEFENCE FORCES 
2.1. Territorial Defence System 
2.1.1. Description of the Territorial Defence System 
Finland employs a territorial defence system. Accordingly, the country 
is divided into seven operational military areas, each having the ability 
to function independently. Each of the areas is supported by both the 
naval and air components. The military areas are further divided into 
20 military districts for purposes of local defence and mobilization. 
This system of a dispersed chain of command is designed to guarantee 
that our defence capability could not be paralysed during a conflict. 
The system makes it possible for all crisis management measures to be 
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effected throughout the country. In addition, it makes it possible to 
execute mobilization as well as to repel an attack. 
The military areas as well as the naval and air forces use their units, as 
soon as they reach a basic level of readiness, for territorial surveillance, 
point protection and the managing of different types of crisis situations. 
These units can be reinforced through the addition of reserves if required. 
All troops therefore have two main peace-time functions: first, they 
carry out conscript and refresher training integrating conscripts and 
reservists into war-time units and, secondly, they also perform certain 
readiness tasks. 
The units that are formed through mobilization are divided, according 
to their order of mobilization urgency, into "core forces", "fast 
deployment forces" and "main forces". In addition, according to their 
operational task, the troops are divided into local and general forces. 
The local forces are established in each military district to carry out 
reconnaissance and surveillance, point protection and local defence 
tasks. The network of local defence covers the whole country. The 
general forces are mobile and can react to the particular needs that are 
required to repel any threat to the different areas of the country. Whereas 
the most important function of the local forces is to slow down and 
wear out the attacker, the main function of the general forces is to 
repulse the enemy. Both the general and local forces support each other 
in the carrying out of their assigned tasks. 
The foundation on which the principle of territorial defence rests is that 
of a large trained reserve. Through this system defence preparations 
can be carried out throughout the whole area of the country. The 
purpose of this system of defence is to indicate that an attack on 
Finland would, from the point of view of the goals of the attacker, lead 
to a lengthy fight and relatively large losses of men and equipment. The 
aim is that the territorial defence system would also have a preventive 
influence regarding the intentions of any potential attacker. In addition, 
the system is designed for a measured response, led flexibly by regional 
commanders, to different levels and types of threatening situations that 
might arise anywhere throughout the country. 
The defence administration have plans to rationalize the defence system 
so that the number of command levels will be reduced by about half of 
what they are today. The seven military area command levels are to be 
replaced by three "defence zones" and the 20 military districts by 12 
"military regions". The reforms are presented in section 3. 
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2.1.2 Troop requirements and general conscription 
The total troop requirements of the Defence Forces are determined by 
many factors. Determinants such as the required tasks ascribed by law, 
the territorial defence system, the large area of Finland, the amount and 
quality of material required, the military potential presented by the 
environment as well as the country's main security goal, the prevention 
and deterrence of war; all influence the dimensions of the defence 
organization. 
The tasks of the Defence Forces can be divided between their actual 
defence tasks and the collateral support functions such as military 
training and aiding the civil authorities. The defence tasks can be 
divided into areas that encompass command, reconnaissance and 
surveillance, repelling violations of air-space, point protection, 
demonstration of an ability to defend and the repelling of any attack. 
For the nation-wide carrying out of these tasks the Defence Forces 
mainly rely on trained reserve forces. 
Owing to the concept of general conscription the total number of trained 
reserves in Finland is slightly more than 1 000 000 men. The defence 
system is constructed in such a way that, if required, the whole pool of 
trained reserves could be employed. During war all the reserves would 
not be subject to purely military tasks, since some would be needed to 
handle other non-military tasks that need to be carried out. Part of the 
reserves, owing to factors of health or age, would not be suitable for 
placement with units engaged in war-time activities. 
The Defence Forces' total strength during war has been projected to be 
about half a million men. To organize, establish and equip a defence 
organization of this magnitude together with the necessary reserves 
requires about 700 000 men. Although these numbers are relatively 
large they are not, compared to Finland's size and population, vastly 
different from the strength of comparable forces in other European 
countries. 
A territorial defence system is typical of countries that have limited 
material resources. By covering the whole area of the country and by 
demonstrating a readiness to carry on fighting deep within the country 
this system attempts to prevent any attacker with greater fire-power 
and mobility from achieving a quick settlement to the hostilities. 
Likewise, this system attempts to compensate for missing combat 
elements such as ground-attack fighters. In order for a territorial defence 
52 
system to function effectively a rather large number of troops is required. 
In all European countries that employ a territorial defence system the 
formation of units is carried out through the mobilization of the pool of 
reserves that are created through the system of general conscription. 
2.1.3. Types of troops and their tasks 
The Defence Forces' war time units are divided on the basis of 
mobilization urgency and level of equipment into core forces (about 60 
000 men), fast deployment forces (about 270 000 men) and main forces 
(over 200 000 men). 
When a crisis threatens the first units organized will be from within the 
core troops whose units are formed by reinforcing the peace-time units 
with reserves. 
The tasks of the core forces are territorial surveillance, repelling of 
territorial violations, point protection as well as other types of crisis 
management functions. As the best armed and most quickly organized 
units the core forces also have the important task of repelling a surprise 
attack. 
If the situation becomes more critical, the fast deployment forces are 
called upon to reinforce the core forces. The most important tasks of the 
fast deployment forces are to ensure the inviolability of national territory, 
to protect important targets and installations as well as to prevent any 
potential aggressor from utilizing our territory against a third party. 
With these forces it is endeavored to prevent any military measures 
being directed against our country as well as to safeguard the 
mobilization of the main forces. During war the fast deployment forces 
are employed in the focal points of combat activity. 
After the formation of the core and fast deployment forces, the main 
forces units are established. The main forces are formed almost entirely 
from the reserves. The task of the main forces is to increase the depth 
and repellant capabilities of the defence effort and therefore also to 
play a part in the prevention of war. 
The material resources available to the troops have been heavily 
prioritized in such a manner that the best material is given over to the 
core forces. The material at their disposal can be viewed in many areas 
to represent, from a qualitative perspective, the minimum required to 
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conduct operations on a modern battlefield. The material procurement 
for the fast deployment forces has been influenced by the 
recommendations of the third parliamentary defence committee. 
However, the allocated financial resources have not been adequate to 
fulfil these recommendations on schedule. The main forces have at 
their disposal the oldest and, from a combat point of view, the bare 
minimum needed to perform their assigned tasks. 
The core, fast deployment and main forces all contain elements of the 
ground forces. Owing to the relatively large size of our country and 
especially due to the nature of the territorial defence system the Defence 
Forces are strongly weighted in favor of the ground forces so that over 
90 % of our war-time troops belong to this branch of the armed forces. 
A partial reason for this is that with the meager resources available it 
has been possible to acquire relatively inexpensive material suitable for 
territorial defence which can be used by our large trained reserves. 
The most important units of the approximately 490 000 strong ground 
forces are the brigades. In addition to these units, the high command 
has at its disposal different types of artillery, air defence, combat 
engineer, signal and logistics units. Altogether there are 27 brigades of 
which 2 are armoured brigades, 10 light infantry brigades that belong 
to the fast deployment forces and 15 brigades which are engaged in 
local defence tasks (Brigade 80). 
The tasks of the naval and air forces are, above all, to ensure the 
integrity of the country's borders, to offer reconnaissance assets during 
crisis situations and to support the military areas during time of war. 
The strength of the war-time navy is approximately 12 000 men. The 
range of combat vessels includes different types of ships such as missile 
boats, mine sweepers and mine-laying craft. The number of combat 
ships is about 30. The system also includes land-based command centres 
as well as support and logistics units. 
The strength of the war-time air force is approximately 30 000 men. The 
activities of the air force are carried out within the framework of three 
air wings. The air wings have at their disposal their allocated number 
of fighter planes in addition to reconnaissance and transport planes 
and helicopters. There are approximately 60 fighters. The air force also 
encompasses command centers as well as aerial surveillance, air defence 
and airbase units. 
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The tasks of the Frontier Guards are to guard and maintain surveillance 
over the country's borders and, together with the police, to maintain 
order and safety within the border and sea areas as well as to act in 
concert with the customs service to aid in their activities. The Frontier 
Guards take part in national defence and can, by decree, be joined to 
the Defence Forces if required. The Frontier Guards are divided into 
core and fast deployment forces, and their war-time strength is 
approximately 25 000 men, most of whom belong to the ground forces. 
During war the Frontier Guards units engage mainly in guerrilla 
activities as part of the operations in the military area in which they are 
engaged in. 
2.2. Troop performance capability 
2.2.1. Total material state 
The Defence Forces' material is, in principle, divided into two parts: 
first, that which is under the direct control of the Defence Forces and, 
secondly, that which during crisis situations is either bought or 
requisitioned from the public at large. The share of material requisitioned 
from society is markedly greater in Finland than that which is generally 
considered necessary elsewhere. This is due to the fact that the amount 
of funds available for military procurement is kept at a relatively low 
level in Finland. 
The amount of material obtained from society during the period of 
mobilization is considerable, in certain areas it can even constitute the 
main portion. Most of the vehicles used in war-time are obtained through 
civilian requisition. Similarly, nearly half of the material needs of the 
combat engineer and signal units as well as about a third of logistics 
supplies are obtained from society. The problem with certain types of 
goods needed by the Defence Forces is that the amounts required are 
not obtainable in Finland during a time of crisis and consequently 
could not be drawn down from stock in warehouses. In addition part of 
the material obtained is poorly suited for use in war-time conditions. 
The greatest part of the material possessed by the Defence Forces dates 
from the period of the Second World War. For this reason part of the 
equipment no longer meets the demands of modern combat. The core 
forces and parts of the fast deployment forces have more modem 
material. 
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The fact that more than half of the long-term material procurement 
funding is given over to the core troops (about 60 000 men) clearly 
demonstrates the low level of procurement resources and also the 
conscious effort to concentrate material towards those forces that can 
be quickly mobilized. 
The following section will analyse the total material state of the Defence 
Forces on the basis of the following central determinants necessary for 
the efficient functioning of any military organization: mobility, fire-
power, combat endurance and command capability. As the element of 
comparison we use the principle of "required strength", which means 
the quantity of material that has been estimated to be essential for the 
efficient functioning of the forces involved. 
Mobility 
The Defence Forces troop mobility is based on obtaining 90% of the 
vehicles needed from the general public. With regard to.such types of 
vehicles that are unobtainable from civilian sources, such as certain 
types of all-purpose and combat vehicles, the Defence Forces possess 
about one fifth of the required strength. Equipment needed for water 
crossings, such as ferries and pontoons, are available at about half their 
required numbers. Fixed-span bridging equipment, an essential 
component of brigade support, is totally lacking. 
Fire-power 
The supply of assault rifles is sufficient for arming slightly over half of 
the troops. The rest are fitted out with weaponry dating from World 
War II. 
Over half of the artillery and mortar equipment dates from the 1930's 
and 1940's and no longer meets performance requirements. Part of the 
outmoded artillery has been modernized to conform to current 
requirements. Since World War II the artillery caliber has noticeably 
increased and range has doubled due to increased performance 
requirements. 
Over half of the fixed coastal artillery consists of modern 130 millimetre 
or 100 millimetre turret guns. The rest of the equipment is of older 
vintage. 
The domestically produced bazookas, which were manufactured in the 
1950's as anti-tank weapons, have become obsolete. The situation has 
been rectified through the acquisition of missiles and heavy disposable 
anti-tank weapons. The problem area continues to be the rather small 
numerical amount of these weapons as well as the limited range of the 
heavy disposable anti-tank weapons. As far as anti-tank mines are 
concerned, the situation is satisfactory. 
With respect to anti-aircraft weaponry, about a quarter is old and only 
adequately suited to its task. The main pieces of equipment are 23 
millimetre guns which, although rather modest in radius of action, are 
fit for use. With the purchase of the anti-aircraft missiles the range can 
be slightly increased. However, the amount of available equipment is a 
limiting factor with regard to the areas it can be concentrated in. The 
anti-aircraft missiles used to protect the area around the capital will 
become obsolete during this decade. 
There is a noticeable deficiency with regard to munitions. The greatest 
shortages involve anti-tank weapons, mortars and artillery. The Defence 
Forces annually consume more ammunition during training than it is 
able to acquire with its operating and maintenance budgets. 
Combat Endurance 
The material requirements in the area of combat endurance are 
considered in this connection to include billeting and provisions 
equipment, articles for protection and other clothing material as well as 
medical supplies. 
The available equipment for billeting and provisions is nearly sufficient. 
The amount of available clothing covers about half the requirements. 
For this reason the reservists' own supplies are significant in meeting 
the total material needs in this area. Fatigues are in sufficient supply to 
distribute to everyone. However, there exists a shortage with regard to 
winter clothing and equipment. In the area of protective equipment 
there is a deficiency of personal protective equipment. There is a 
deficiency of personal protective outfits as well as, among other things, 
cleaning equipment. The radiation control net is functional. 
In the field of medical materials there are some significant shortages. 
The medical equipment situation concerning the troops is, however, 
relatively good. The shortages that do exist are in the areas of medical 
vehicles and field hospital equipment. 
Command Capability 
The problems concerning the communications equipment necessary 
for command activities are both the expense of the equipment involved 
as well as the relatively short service life of the equipment owing to the 
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rapid development of jamming systems. For these reasons the greatest 
shortages occur with regard to radio and field telephone equipment. 
The limited material available is concentrated in such a manner so as to 
directly serve the troops engaged in combat. 
2.2.2. Material production possibilities during a crisis 
Only a small portion of the necessary material needed by the Defence 
Forces could be fabricated during a crisis situation. What could be 
produced would be different types of consumption goods, of which the 
most important would be ammunition. 
The industrial sector that supplies the Defence Forces during peace-
time could, within limits, increase their production on relatively short 
notice. The process of getting other production under way would take 
months. Domestic industry would be capable of producing some of the 
needs of the Defence Forces during crises provided that production 
remains undisturbed and that factory facilities stay outside the purview 
of enemy activity. Consequently, the level of peace-time stocks form, 
from the point of view of defence planning, a decisive point of departure. 
2.2.3. Troop performance capability 
2.2.3.1. Factors influencing performance capability 
Factors influencing troop performance capability include the amount 
and quality of personnel, the will to defend, training as well as the 
demands of modern combat. 
The Defence Forces get the main share of their personnel from the 
ranks of trained reservists. The amount of these reservists is sufficient. 
Over 80 % of the available reserves are placed in war-time formations. 
There are not sufficient numbers of cadre personnel for use in war-
time. This shortcoming is rectified through the use of reservists. The 
number of personnel available during peace-time militates against the 
maintenance of, for instance, an around the clock system of territorial 
surveillance. 
The level of education of the personnel employed by the Defence 
Forces is good and that of the reserves is satisfactory. Because it is not 
possible for the entire reserves to take part in military refresher training, 
training has been prioritized is such a manner that all core forces 
participate in training during a five-year period and all support troops 
in a corresponding 5-7 year time frame. With regard to the main forces, 
only commanders and some other key personnel engage in refresher 
training. 
Questions relating to material have already been discussed on a general 
level earlier and they will be presented again when we analyse the 
performance capabilities of individual troop detachments. Problems 
involving material influence significantly the level of performance 
capability. 
Due to the marked development in the field of military technology the 
picture of a modern battlefield is continuously undergoing change. The 
armies of the great powers have been able to increase their mobility and 
fire-power significantly. They have developed more effective transport 
planes, helicopters, assault and landing equipment as well as new 
systems that increase the fire-power of artillery, rocket launchers, and 
ground-attack aircraft. For example, the firepower of ground-attack 
aircraft of the opposing great powers has increased manifold during 
the 1980's. New technologies have made possible more efficient 
intelligence gathering and real time command, accurate direction of 
fire-power also under conditions of darkness and inclement weather as 
well as the transfer of great amounts of information that can be 
communicated in real- time. The abovementioned developments 
naturally have an influence when appraising our troop performance 
capability. 
2.2.3.2 Ground forces performance capability 
With regard to the ground forces only the brigades will be examined in 
detail. The other troops will be discussed through a general outline. 
The Defence Forces have three types of brigades - the brigade 80, the 
light infantry brigade and the armoured brigade. 
The brigade 80's, which together comprise 15 brigades, are formations 
which are given the task of territorial defence. Their mobility is based 
on tractors, trucks, and other means of transportation obtained from 
civilian sources. With regard to the material requirements of these 
brigades, it must be stated that there are inadequacies involving 
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firepower and mobility. Artillery and mortar equipment as well as anti-
tank weaponry are obsolete and the brigades' supplies of winter clothing 
and command equipment are deficient. 
Light infantry brigades are meant to be employed throughout the country 
and also to engage in mobile combat such as counter-attacking. The 
mobility of the combat units is based on the use of all-terrain or armoured 
vehicles. The goal of the Defence Forces is to have 10 of these brigades. 
These brigades are better equipped than the brigade 80's. Shortages of 
required equipment are especially to be found in areas involving anti-
tank and anti-aircraft weaponry as well as materials necessary for 
combat endurance and operational command and control. At present 
there are sufficient numbers of combat and all-purpose vehicles available 
to equip a little more than two brigades. The other brigades, which lack 
access to this equipment, have had to make due with civilian vehicles. 
There are two armoured brigades. One of these is equipped with T-72 
main battle tanks while the other is outfitted with modified versions of 
T-55's. The brigade which is equipped with the more modern equipment 
is in a satisfactory state of readiness. The other brigade lacks all-purpose 
trucks and part of the necessary armoured combat vehicles. The brigade's 
artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry do not fully meet the required 
performance standards. 
The ground forces' other units are either local troops or general troops 
used in support of the brigades. Both the guard and intercept units of 
the local troops are outfitted with old equipment. However, the units 
involved with guerrilla activity have new material at their disposal. 
Also the coastal defence forces have more modern weaponry to work 
with, for example 20 % of the units have 130 millimetre turret gun 
equipment and 40 % are equipped with 100 millimetre turret guns. The 
coastal artillery also possesses a small amount of ground-to-sea missiles. 
The different units belonging to the general troops can either be put at 
the disposal of the high command or used as combat support for the 
brigades. These units possess both old and new equipment. One third 
of the field artillery batteries are up-to-date. About a quarter of the anti-
aircraft units are outfitted with equipment dating from the 1940's, other 
units have newer missile and artillery equipment. Part of the anti-
armour units are armed with old-fashioned bazookas while other parts 
have anti-tank missiles. This type of material division is also common 
to the engineer, signal and logistics units. 
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2.2.3.3. Naval forces performance capability 
The striking power of the naval forces is centered on a flotilla of missile 
boats. The squadron of Helsinki-class missile boats is totally operational. 
The first boat of the Rauma-class vessels has been commissioned. The 
range of the missiles has been deemed to be sufficient for our 
circumstances. There are still some problems involving the accuracy of 
the missiles and the amount available is limited. The naval forces also 
suffer from a lack of ammunition. 
The Tuima-class of missile boats will be removed from operation by 
1995 due to their becoming obsolete. At that time the boats will be 
adapted for mine-laying. In addition, the Nuoli-class reconnaissance 
boats will be retired in the near future. 
The naval forces have a sufficient mine-laying capability. Within the 
space of a few days they would be able to lay such a mine barrier that 
direct access to the harbours via the most important sea lanes would be 
prevented. If required to, most combat vessels have the capability to lay 
tactical mine-fields. The mines are partly contact mines of the type used 
during the Second World War and partly more modern impulse mines. 
There are two mine ships fit for use in the open sea. 
The renovated R-class patrol boats will achieve an operational state by 
the mid-1990's. When this takes place those vessels designed especially 
for anti-submarine operations will be removed from service. Anti-
submarine capabilities are meant to be upgraded through later 
procurement. 	 - 
2.2.3.4 Air forces performance capability 
The deterrent capability of our air force is based upon three squadrons 
of fighter aircraft. There are about 60 of these fighters. This amount is 
rather small when the extent of Finnish airspace is taken into 
consideration. The fighters are, however, able to ensure the inviolability 
of our airspace during peace-time and when war threatens. During war 
they will inflict losses on the attacker's air assets, but they will not be 
able to prevent his activities. Finland does not possess ground-attack 
aircraft necessary to support her ground troops. 
Our Draken and MiG-21 bis fighters are capable of performing all-
weather interception. However, when looking at the developments in 
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the environment they would be operating in, one can spot certain 
weaknesses. One weakness is the lack of capability to intercept targets 
flying below the aircraft as well as poor electronic countermeasure 
tolerance. The technical service life of our fighters has been calculated 
to end during a seven year period which will commence during the 
middle of this decade. 
Hawk trainer aircraft form the basis of our flight training system. 
Through them we are able to offer high quality fighter training. It is of 
critical importance to maintain a sufficient supply of these aircraft for 
the long term bearing in mind the attrition rate due to accidents. At 
present, there are 45 Hawk trainers available for use. 
The air defence control-and-command systems have been modernized 
to take into account the demands of the operating environment. The 
most serious shortcomings arise in the area of low-level air surveillance 
where, depending on the situation, there can emerge rather large gaps 
in radar coverage. Through the updating of the short-range and long-
range surveillance systems it is endeavored to have the capability to 
form points of surveillance concentration. 
The support system has been developed to accommodate a flexible 
system of using surveillance and interception capabilities so that these 
tasks can, if necessary, be carried out from anywhere in the country. 
The greatest shortcomings in the system are the limited number of 
missiles for the fighters and the shortage of fortified alert facilities. 
2.3. The ability of the Defence Forces to carry out their assigned tasks 
The following will examine the ability of the Defence Forces to carry 
out their assigned tasks based on the accounts given to the advisory 
board. The examination will focus only on the actual defence tasks of 
the Defence Forces, the carrying out of which call for operational 
command-and-control, the ability to repel acts of territorial violation, 
point protection and the repelling of an attack. 
Command and control 
The basic structure of the Defence Forces command and control system 
is ready and operational. A series of command structure and 
organizational reforms has sought to achieve increased efficiency. 
Problems in this area are, above all, related to those concerned with 
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crisis command. At many levels of command there still do not exist 
fortified operations facilities nor the necessary number of air shelters. 
The communications equipment is old and partly deficient. The real 
time data transfer process between command staffs has not yet reached 
a satisfactory level. The increased level of preparedness that would 
come about through linking the command and control system to the 
civilian communications network would take time and might delay 
defence measures. 
Surveillance and the repelling of territorial violations 
The tasks of surveillance and the repelling of territorial violations are 
performed during peace-time by the border and coast guards, coastal 
units as well as the naval and air forces. In reality, as the state of 
readiness is raised all troops take part in territorial control together 
with their other functions. In addition, the ground forces work together 
with the border guards to maintain the ability to control the national 
frontiers to the extent that thev have the capabilities to observe unlawful 
crossings of the border as well as the means to repel those crossings 
which, from a security point of view, might threaten the country. If the 
situation warrants, the border guards can in a relatively short time 
increase their strength through the addition of reserves. 
The carrying out of sea surveillance is handled by about 40 radar 
stations of which about half are under the control of the Defence Forces. 
The coverage of the radars directed towards the Gulf of Finland is 
sufficiently complete. However, that which is directed towards the 
Gulf of Bothnia has gaps. The radar surveillance is complemented by 
sensory observational equipment as well as by underwater surveillance 
devices located along important sea lanes. While the technical 
possibilities for around-the-clock radar measurements exist, they are 
not used to full effect in peace-time. The amount of available staff limits 
the time during which radar operations can be performed to a period of 
from nine to sixteen hours per day which results in gaps in effective 
radar surveillance. If required, sea surveillance can be temporarily 
intensified. However, an intensified use of radars would call for 
mobilization of extra personnel within the space of a few days. 
In the state of basic preparedness during peace-time air surveillance is 
carried out by three long-range radars around-the-clock and 21 middle-
range radars for periods averaging about eight hours per day. The 
latter radars, are used alternatively so gaps emerge in the tracking 
operations carried out at lower altitudes. Air surveillance can be 
upgraded to being operational around-the-clock within the same limits 
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imposed upon sea surveillance. To increase the operational time of the 
middle-range radars from about eight hours to, for example, twelve 
hours would require that extra personnel be called to duty and sensory 
air surveillance units be established. That would mean that the coverage 
offered by the system would be nearly total. However, there would still 
remain shortcomings related to detecting low-flying small targets such 
as cruise missiles. 
The repelling of territorial violations occurring at border areas is the 
task of the Frontier Guards whose units can, if needed, be reinforced or 
supported by units of the Defence Forces. 
The coast guard and naval units have the responsibility of identification 
of vessels as well as the repelling of any territorial violations taking 
place at sea. The same task can be undertaken, weather conditions 
permitting, by the air force. In certain situations, the repelling of 
territorial violations from the sea can also be carried out by of coastal 
artillery units operating out of their fortified readiness sites. 
For purposes of surveillance and the repelling of territorial violations, 
the air force wings have at their disposal equipment in their main bases 
which are in continuous readiness and which could be airborne in a 
matter of minutes. In addition, duty turns are carried out at civilian 
airports on a rotating basis. There are also aircraft on duty for sea 
surveillance, the taking of air samples and rescue operations. As the 
degree of alert increases, also the anti-aircraft units can be used to 
counter acts of territorial violations. 
The operational level of the ground, sea and air surveillance systems as 
well as the systems used to repel territorial violations are deemed 
sufficient for their tasks during peace-time. The greatest problem in this 
area is the lack of trained personnel which makes it impossible to 
maintain around-the-clock radar coverage of both the sea area and 
airspace as well as militating against establishment of a full capability 
to repel territorial violations. If surveillance needs to be made more 
effective, reserves must be called up. In this way guard and surveillance 
activities could be made to cover the entire border area, all naval 
vessels could be made operational and the support role carried out by 
the air force could be implemented throughout the whole country. 
However, even after these measures have been undertaken, there would 
still be problems related to electronic warfare measures and small low-
flying targets. 
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Point Protection 
During peace-time the Defence Forces have the capability to protect 
important installations such as command posts, command centres and 
depots as well as having the ability, if needed, to assist the police in 
such functions as isolating a particular area or temporarily guarding 
property. Under the system of territorial defence, responsibility for 
point protection is given over to the local forces. Before their 
establishment, protective duties will be performed by units composed 
of conscripts. The local forces have a war-time strength of 160 000 men. 
This number includes all the border guards, most of the coastal forces 
as well as the units given the responsibility of protecting airports and 
other corresponding installations. Owing to the fact that the area of our 
country is relatively large, it is clear that many points remain outside 
the operational purview of our forces. Nationwide there are about 1500 
points to be protected of which about 1000 are civilian installations. The 
responsibility for part of them is given over to the police. 
The protection of vital installations such as those involving national 
and regional leadership, communications, traffic and energy production 
centres as well as military installations and depots has in recent years 
become more urgent due to the development of different types of units 
specializing in intelligence-gathering and sabotage. The need to employ 
protective measures might become necessary even before the actual 
commencement of military action. This emphasizes the need for a high 
degree of preparedness. There are only a fairly small number of troops 
employed in point protection and the weaponry and other equipment 
at their disposal is quite old. 
Repelling of attacks 
Under the system of territorial defence the ground forces assume the 
central role in both preventing and repelling an attack. Consequently, 
the significance of the army during war and other forms of armed 
conflict or the threat thereof is decisive. Our small navy and air force 
are, in spite of their deficiencies, the most efficient elements of our 
defence system. However, it can be observed that their operational 
capabilities would be depleted rapidly, possibly even during the threat 
of war. 
The number of troops from which the ground forces are composed 
corresponds, in relative terms, to the strength of the ground forces of 
other nations comparable to us and makes possible the defence of all 
parts of the country. In terms of quality of equipment our forces must 
make do with material that is both older and more deficient than the 
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corresponding types of equipment used by our nearest neighbours. In 
addition, a sizeable share of the equipment needed would have to be 
obtained from other areas of society. 
From the point of view of repelling attack the greatest defects are to be 
found in areas relating to mobility, anti-armour, anti-aircraft, indirect 
fire, and ammunition needs as well as to certain equipment connected 
with battle endurance and command. 
The primary goal of the Defence Forces is that merely their existence 
alone should serve as enough of a deterrent to prevent armed measures 
being directed against our country. In the event that this alone is not 
sufficient to deter an attack, the Defence Forces must have the capabilities 
themselves to repel any such aggression. The better equipped our 
troops are, the better chance they will have to carry out their assigned 
tasks. 
Due the current level of material that the Defence Forces have at their 
disposal they are capable of repelling only a small and geographically 
limited armed attack in a satisfactory manner. In the event of a wide-
scale attack the limited amount of high-level technical material as well 
as deficiencies having to do with mobility, fire-power and troop 
protection would lead, in a relatively short time, to our troops suffering 
great losses. 
2.4. The advisory board's appraisal of the Defence Forces current 
state and performance capability 
The parliamentary advisory board for defence policy has familiarized 
itself with the current state of the Defence Forces and with the 
performance capacity of certain integral parts such as the territorial 
defence system, the fortnation and necessity of reserve forces, aggregate 
material situation, the performance capacities of the ground, naval and 
air forces as well as the problems concerned with production of defence 
material. Many important areas were left unexamined, for example 
legislation concerning the total defence effort which is currently under 
consideration before Parliament. Due to the tight schedule under which 
the advisory board had to work, it was felt that it would not be possible 
to express views regarding all sectors of the issue at hand. The board 
therefore felt it would be more efficacious to concentrate totally on 
three aspects of the subject: questions related to the system of territorial 
defence, the situation relating to material and performance capability 
of the troops as well as the ability of the Defence Forces to carry out 
their assigned tasks. In this connection we use the current state as the 
basis of the assessment, while the views concerning future developments 
are presented in section 3. 
The advisory board believes that the system of territorial defence is still 
the system that is most suited to the special conditions found in our 
country. It facilitates the possibility of obtaining both a moderate defence 
capability and the ability to prevent armed conflict without the 
expenditure of large resources. This force can only be obtained through 
a system of universal male conscription. This is supported by voluntary 
national defence activities. 
There are notable deficiencies in the Defence Forces' total material 
situation which influences the Defence Forces' ability to carry out its 
tasks. The advisory board does not start from the assumption that all 
troops should achieve a similar qualitative level of performance 
capability. The strong material prioritization in favour of the core and 
fast deployment forces is viewed as a correct principle, especially in 
relation to the nature of the threat involved. It should, however, be the 
starting point that all war-time units and the men who are attached to 
them should have sufficient equipment with which to perform their 
assigned tasks. 
At the current time especially the ground forces possess large amounts 
of over-age material which is unsuitable in regard to meeting the 
necessary levels of performance. The amount of material which either 
must be bought or requisitioned from society during the process of 
troop formation is considerable. This is especially true with regard to 
the important core and fast deployment forces. It is the view of the 
advisory board that the possibility of raising the level of domestic 
defence material production capabilities should be investigated. 
However, the point of departure in this area should be that during 
peace-time the available stocks form the decisive base on which defence 
ability rests. Especially in relation to certain types of ammunition, the 
amount of supplies on hand is currently insufficient. 
The ability of the Defence Forces to carry out its assigned tasks will 
now be assessed by the advisory board. 
The Defence Forces' command and control system is structurally 
functional. During times of crisis the system is hampered by deficient 
communications equipment as well as the weak level of command 
posts. 
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It is the view of the board that during peace-time the Defence Forces 
possess a satisfactory capability with regard to surveillance functions 
and the repelling of territorial violations. There are, however, significant 
gaps in the system of surveillance due to, for example, the ability of the 
medium-range radars to be operational only for periods that average 
eight hours per day owing to a lack of trained personnel. The 
enhancement of surveillance would demand the calling up of reserves 
within a few days' time. 
The Defence Forces possess the capability to protect their most important 
installations such as command posts, command and communications 
centres and depots. During times of crisis and war the Defence Forces' 
personnel are capable of protecting about half of the important national 
installations. The protection of the greater part of civilian premises falls 
under the jurisdiction of other authorities, chiefly the police. 
The Defence Forces' task of national defence is hampered in certain 
critical areas by a quantitative and qualitative lack of the necessary 
material. At the same time, these shortcomings influence the ability of 
Finland to prevent itself from being drawn into crisis situations and 
war. The problems concerning the ability to repel aggression revolve 
around the material available to the ground forces which is rapidly 
becoming obsolete. The advisory board observes that material 
procurement should be strongly directed towards having the core and 
fast deployment forces reach an operational level in the areas of mobility, 
firepower, protection and command capability. 
The number of local in relation to that of the general forces could 
perhaps be raised to relieve material procurement. It is the point of 
view of the advisory board that the current main forces should be only 
viewed as forces which possess suitable equipment for their tasks of 
local surveillance, protection and defence. 
3.8. The advisory board's views regarding the Defence Forces' 
development plans and defence appropriations for the 1990's 
The parliamentary advisory board for defence policy has received an 
account of the Defence Forces' procurement needs for the 1990's as well 
as an estimate of the resources required. The presentations have focused 
on the defence system as well as material questions related to the 
ground, naval and air forces. In addition, the board has received the 
main outlines of the plans dealing with developments relating to 
training, construction and defence material production. The General 
Headquarters has submitted their funding requirements. The Ministry 
of Finance has presented to the board its views regarding the economic 
outlook during the coming years. 
The board has evaluated the Defence Forces' development plans in 
light of the ongoing changes taking place in Finland's security 
environment. The societal changes taking place in Europe influence the 
development of these plans. However, conclusions must be based on 
long-term, lasting development trends. 
The board notes in this connection that the ending of the political 
division of Europe and the loosening of confrontation between the 
opposing military alliances has reinforced military stability and has 
fundamentally decreased the threat of war. The ongoing negotiating 
processes have set in motion force reductions on the part of both 
military alliances. At the same time, new types of security problems 
have arisen in Europe based on the uneven political and economic 
development of different countries. In order to prevent conflicts and to 
promote their peaceful solution attempts have been made to make the 
CSCE process more effective. 
The lessening of the state of bipolar military confrontation has also 
influenced the strategic situation in the northern parts of Europe. It is of 
utmost importance that Finland continues to carefully monitor these 
developments. 
Some of the changes which are still in their initial stage of development 
include: 
— The military withdrawal of the Soviet Union back to its own national 
territory and the attendant restructuring of its defence organization, 
including the status of the Baltic states in this context, 
— The endeavours of the Eastern European members of the Warsaw 
Pact to find a new security accommodation with both the East and 
the West, 
— The emergence of a united Germany as the leading economic power 
of both Central Europe and the Baltic Sea area. 
In addition, the significance of Northern Europe in the strategic 
relationship between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union will be maintained 
and, especially from the point of view of naval developments, it will be 
enhanced. 
Conventional disarmament has been started up especially through the 
reduction of offensive weapons systems. The role of nuclear arms 
continues to decline. However, the qualitative development and renewal 
of weapons systems continues. Even after all the weapons systems 
agreed to be reduced will have been taken away, moved back and 
destroyed, the amount of fire-power remaining in Europe will 
considerably exceed that which is necessary for national defence. In 
addition, increased emphasis on national defence requirements has 
also been observed. 
Also Finland must make sure that it will be able to maintain stable 
national defence capabilities that will be credible in its security 
environment. By so doing we can affect the process through which the 
growth of security and stability can fully benefit also our own area. 
The disarmament agreements finalized so far do not bring much military 
change to Finland's immediate security environment. However, both 
NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces come under new types of 
regulations as far as verification and openness is concerned. For Finland 
it is important that in the future also our surroundings will directly 
benefit from conventional and nuclear disarmament. 
The structural military changes being undertaken by the members of 
the two military alliances are not, in the same degree, necessary for 
neutral Finland, though the new requirements for openness present 
new tasks also for our Defence Forces. 
A new forum for dealing with the question of military security, which 
is to be established in 1992, will give the CSCE countries the possibility 
of pursuing their national security interests during the ongoing period 
of change. Similarly, a common security system can be further developed 
through reductions in force levels as well as through further promoting 
of measures advancing military openness and trust. 
In this new forum the armed forces of the neutral nations, such as 
Finland, will for the first time be placed on an equal footing with those 
of the other nations. The process of preparing for this forum will be one 
of the central tasks of our security policy in the near future. 
The factors outlined above signify that there are taking place continuous 
and fundamental qualitative changes in Finland's security policy 
environment. Defence planning must therefore be adapted to take these 
changes into consideration. Because of this it should be stressed that 
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the long-term plan is based on uncertain assessments. Therefore, defence 
planners should be prepared for a continuous reassessment of the basic 
tenets of policy. 
In the course of its work the board has stated that it would be useful to 
further evaluate the changes occurring in Finland's international 
environment and the progress taking place with regard to European 
disarmament as well as their combined influence on the Defence Forces' 
development. Therefore, the board proposes that the advisory board to 
be appointed for the next term of Parliament take these questions 
under consideration during its work. 
The development principles of the defence system that have been put 
forth by the Defence Forces are regarded by the board to be justified. It 
is important that the point of departure for development of the Defence 
Forces be the ability to manage low-level crises, and if required, the 
ability to defend the preservation of national independence. These 
starting points and the measures necessary to carry them into effect 
have, together with political action, an influence in the prevention of 
war. 
The board stresses the significance of reconnaissance and surveillance 
measures as well as the securing of territorial inviolability. 
The board would also wish to emphasize the importance of protecting 
during the early stages of a crisis those installations necessary for the 
maintenance of essential societal functions. This would call for, among 
other things, the protection of administrative and national defence 
leadership as well as command-and-control facilities located throughout 
the country. The job of performing these protective tasks can befall 
upon the core and fast deployment forces which is why these 
considerations must be taken into account in equipping these troops. 
The board proposes that it should be determined how the Defence 
Forces' readiness to assist other authorities in the controlling of different 
types of crisis situations can be made more effective. 
The territorial defence system remains a system best suited for our 
conditions. It is a defence system which emphasizes the employment of 
ground forces. The main tasks of the naval and air forces under this 
system are to ensure territorial inviolability, reconnaissance and the 
support of the operations undertaken by the ground forces. A relatively 
large pool of reservists is necessary in Finland owing to factors related 
to the amount of funds directed toward defence as well as the large 
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area of our country. The reserves required can only be obtained through 
a system of universal male conscription. 
Universal conscription is still a suitable military system. It is even-
handed, taking equally into account the different parts of the country 
and is in harmony with our country's system of democracy. 
The Defence Forces have planned to reduce the level of core and fast 
deployment forces to 250 000 men. This is to be achieved by moving 80 
000 men from the fast deployment forces to the main forces. This is a 
solution in the right direction when viewed from the perspective of the 
amount of available resources. The changes will create the preconditions 
necessary for equipping the core and fast deployment forces to a level 
in which they will be able to fulfil different types of crisis management 
tasks. The idea of cost savings is also related to the increase in the level 
of local troops in relation to the general troops. 
The board finds the development plan for the territorial defence system 
to be well-founded. The planned arrangement would improve 
preparedness for regional crisis management as well as increase the 
possibilities for co-operation with other authorities. The planned change-
over from a system of 7 military areas and 23 military districts to one 
composed of 3 national defence zones and 12 military districts signifies 
a reduction by half in the levels of command and is thus a significant 
rationalization measure. This change together with the organizational 
change being carried out by the General Headquarters will affect a 
considerable share of the Defence Forces' personnel and, at the regional 
level, also other societal sectors and national defence measures. The 
board would also like to stress that the new arrangement will serve not 
only as a significant rationalization measure but also to increase defence 
effectiveness. The board wants to stress that the setting up of this new 
system will simplify the command system as well as the regional chain 
of command capabilities towards the ground, naval and air forces. 
Regarding troop development within the territorial defence system 
framework, the board will now give its position towards the 
development plans of the ground, naval and air forces: 
The board finds the ground forces' development plan to be justified. 
The ground forces still form the basis of defence and are the main tool 
for crisis management. This can be seen in the sequence of development 
and the level of equipment - first the core forces, then the fast deployment 
forces and lastly the main forces. The decrease in the number of the fast 
deployment forces by 80 000 men and their shift over to the ranks of the 
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main forces (whose new strength will be 280 000) affects almost solely 
the ground forces. Similarly the measures taken to relieve equipment 
needs through increasing the levels of local troops in relation to general 
troops affect the ground forces. These measures change the relative 
levels of ground force development by increasing the emphasis put on 
the core and fast deployment forces and especially their best units, the 
light infantry and armoured brigades. It is the opinion of the board that 
the significant reduction in the levels of the core and fast deployment 
forces, brought about by economic factors, can be carried out in light of 
the general developments in Europe and without endangering the 
credibility of Finland's defence capability. 
Examination of the funding framework shows that funding is directed 
towards only part of the ground forces. The rest of the troops will have 
to make due with obsolete material. The board, in connection with its 
earlier assessment of the Defence Forces' current state, has asserted that 
every war-time unit, and the men who are placed in it, must have the 
required level of equipment necessary for the performance of its task. 
The board believes that this principle also includes the main forces. The 
most important units of the fast deployment forces must be brought to 
the required level of equipment during the 1990's. While these troops 
are developed, it must be kept in mind that part of the fast deployment 
forces carry out local defence tasks in which case their requirements 
are, for example in comparison to the light infantry brigades, more 
modest. In order to meet their assigned local defence tasks the brigades 
belonging to the main forces must have material meeting at least the 
minimum requirements necessary for anti-armour and air defence 
operations as well as necessary fire-power and adequate protective 
equipment. For other units belonging to the main forces the bare 
minimum requirements should be that each individual soldier has the 
necessary clothing and weaponry needed for carrying out his tasks as 
well as the equipment needed for movement and communications. 
The advisory board believes that a necessary pre-condition for ground 
force development is that a long-term solution should be found that 
would make it possible to evenly replace the equipment that is being 
taken out of operational use. 
The most important development areas for the naval forces during the 
1990's are the improvement of mine-laying capabilities, increasing the 
effectiveness of command, reconnaissance and surveillance systems as 
well as increasing reliability. The advisory board finds that these 
development lines are in harmony with the Defence Forces' over-all 
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view of force development and support the goal of managing crisis 
situations and preventing war. The command and organizational 
developments to take place in the naval forces are appropriate to the 
needs of the territorial defence system. 
The naval forces have stated that the current level of operating and 
maintenance funding creates problems with respect to maintaining 
operations at the necessary level. The advisory board regards the 
operational maintenance of the most important vessels to be necessary 
from the point of view of carrying out surveillance tasks as well as for 
training purposes. 
During the course of its work the advisory board has received 
information from which it became evident that many different 
authorities perform the same type of surveillance tasks in the sea areas. 
A rational division of labour between the different authorities should 
be quickly sought. 
Air force development will in the near future be concentrated in the 
modernization of the command-and-control systems as well as the 
procurement of new fighter aircraft. The advisory board recommends 
that with regard to the purchase of new fighters consideration should 
be given to the purchase of one type of aircraft, since this solution 
would be less expensive and more effective than purchasing more than 
one type. The advisory body believes that the procurement decision 
should be made in such a way that the replacement of the old equipment 
with the new could begin during the middle of this decade. 
The advisory board also attaches special attention to the air force's 
increased needs related to the maintenance of operations and air safety. 
Regarding other development areas the advisory board states that the 
outlines it has received suffice to elicit only these main observations: 
The point of departure for personnel development is the personnel 
requirements of the Defence Forces. Personnel planning must take into 
consideration the requirements for defence, the increase in the general 
level of education as well as the need for the renewed personnel system 
to treat different groups fairly. 
The advisory board finds it important for the Defence Forces to acquire 
capable personnel and to preserve its competitiveness as an employer 
during the 1990's. 
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The advisory board finds the attitude of the Defence Forces regarding 
the maintenance of personnel at their current level to be justified. 
Shortages arising in some activities should primarily be dealt with 
through the increased use of technology and through the internal 
personnel organization of the different service branches. 
The advisory board states that voluntary national defence work has its 
own significance in the carrying out of defence goals. 
The advisory board pays attention to the challenges involved in reserve 
training. It is important to develop training organizations and training 
conditions in such a manner that the reservists find the activities to be 
meaningful and appropriate to their training. The advisory board 
expresses the view that the income losses brought about by participation 
in military refresher training be better compensated. The board also 
emphasizes the need for continuous follow-up and development 
regarding the training of conscripts as well as the maintenance of legal 
protection and the significance of raising their economic conditions. 
Building and property maintenance in one of the Defence Force's 
problem areas. Investment in this sector is justified because the 
construction of fortified facilities is an effective and inexpensive means 
to increase efficiency and the construction of new warehousing facilities 
is necessary for both replacing obsolete buildings as well as reception 
of new material. The weak state of the Defence Forces' fixed property 
and the attendant social and motivational problems it produces with 
respect to conscripts and personnel speaks in favour of the extra funding 
needed for urgent renovation. 
The advisory board has, in conjunction with its estimate of the Defence 
Forces' current state, already given its position regarding the significance 
of the existing available material. In this connection it is important to 
state that the amount of material in stock is decisive from the point of 
view of defence. In addition, it would be necessary to study the 
possibility of raising the level of preparedness of domestic defence 
material production facilities. Because local production facilities can 
only partially compensate for material consumed during a crisis situation 
it would be wise to direct funding towards this particular area. It is the 
board's view that the situation is especially disturbing with regard to 
the state of ammunition. 
The Defence Forces have presented their total funding requirements for 
the decade of the 1990's (1990-1999) to be 127 billion marks calculated 
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at 1991 price levels. Calculations do not include pensions which from 
1991 onwards are to be included in budget expenditures for national 
defence. This would mean that during this period national defence 
would consume, on average, 7,8 % of state expenditures and 
approximately 2 % of gross national product. The real growth rate for 
public expenditures is estimated to average 1,3 % annually during the 
period (1990-1999) and the real growth rate of G.N.P. is estimated to be, 
on average, 2,5 % per year. During this period 65 billion marks of 
appropriation funding would be earmarked for material procurement 
and 7,5 billion marks toward construction and renovation of property. 
The Defence Forces have calculated that at this level of appropriations 
they would be able to equip all core and fast deployment forces. This 
would mean that ten light infantry and two armoured brigades would 
achieve operational levels of performance capacity and that the 
procurement of new fighter aircraft and naval vessels could be carried 
out to the extent planned. The equipping of naval, coastal and air 
surveillance troops as well as the fitting out of the border guards, all 
part of the fast deployment forces, could be met. In addition, the anti-
armour, artillery and air defence units operating under the high 
command could be properly equipped and the brigade 80s belonging 
to the fast deployment forces could obtain their required materials. 
Improvements could be undertaken in providing the proper resources 
for the main forces to carry out their local defence tasks and the personal 
equipping of individual soldiers could be raised. At this level of 
appropriations the Defence Forces would also have the capability to 
construct necessary protective facilities and warehouses as well as 
renovate those instruction, work and accommodation facilities that are 
currently in a poor state. 
The Ministry of Finance has presented to the advisory board its views 
regarding developments in both the national and public economies. 
According to the survey of national and public economic development 
up to the year 1994 which was attached to the national budget proposal 
for 1991, the total level of state expenditures for the period 1992-1994 
will rise, on average, by 1,3 °h per year. The level of defence expenditures 
could correspondingly grow by an average of 1,4 % per year. 
The aforementioned plans are based on the assumption that gross 
national product will rise by 1-2 % per year in the near future. According 
to the latest evaluations, gross national product will rise more slowly in 
the near future or possibly even remain stagnant for a few years. 
Recently, the condition of both the national and public economies has 
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rapidly weakened. As the estimates for gross national product in the 
near future continue to weaken the basic conditions of the national and 
public economies, and as the international outlook also contains many 
uncertainties, it may become necessary to adapt to a lower level of state 
expenditures in the immediate future. If this comes about, it will also 
become necessary to slacken the pace of planned defence expenditures. 
The slowing down of economic activity will have a positive influence 
on the balance of payments developments for the short term. In spite of 
this our country's net debt is expected to rise from the 17 % share of 
gross national product that it was in 1989 to 27 % during the first half of 
this decade while the state's share of foreign debt is expected to remain 
at its 1989 level of 41/2 % of gross national product. The attainment of a 
lasting external balance for our economy can only be brought about 
through a sufficient lowering in the level of demand which presupposes 
a limiting of the increase of public expenditures to an average of I % 
per year. If such were the case the rise in the level of foreign indebtedness 
would terminate in the second half of this decade which would mean 
that overall production could once again be raised to its target level of 
3 % per year. Should the ongoing recession be short-lived and the 
external balance quickly improve, the average growth rate of gross 
national product could reach a level of about 2,5 % per year. 
The parliamentary advisory board for defence policy regards the 
fundamental positive developments occurring in the great power 
relations to have also significantly improved the security situation in 
Europe. Despite the many uncertainties involved in the changes that 
are now taking place in Europe, the board believes that, overall, they 
will have a positive influence. In taking into consideration both these 
developments as well as the unfavorable outlook of the Finnish economy 
for the near future, the board has decided upon a lower target level of 
funding than that outlined by the Defence Forces in its proposals, 
although the board considers these proposals to be well-founded as 
such. 
The advisory board maintains that it is important that the Defence 
Forces, during the 1990's, are developed in a sustained and well-planned 
manner. It is essential that all service branches are given the resources 
with which to carry out their statutory tasks. 
The advisory board recommends that during the 1990's (1990-1999) the 
minimum required funding for national defence, not including pensions, 
be set at about 90 billion marks calculated at 1991 price levels, however, 
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with the proviso that defence appropriations are not to exceed 1,5 % of 
gross national product. With these resources it will be possible, during 
this decade, to equip the light infantry and armoured brigades, begin 
the fighter replacement programme as well as carry out the main naval 
defence procurement. However, during this period part of the fast 
deployment forces and almost the entire main forces will still have to 
make due with obsolete material. 
In its preliminary assessment that has been previously referred to the 
Ministry of Finance has stated that the outlook for the public economy 
during the second half of the 1990's might be more favourable than 
what we can currently expect. Therefore, the advisory board also 
recommends that during the second half of the 1990's, in addition to 
investing in the areas mentioned above, funding should be directed 
towards troop material procurement for the rest of the fast deployment 
forces, improving the weak situation regarding ammunition as well as 
the renovation of buildings and other property. 
Taking into consideration the length of the planning period it is the 
view of the advisory board that during the course of the period the 
planning principles must be constantly assessed. 
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